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Emotional Distress and the 
Psychotherapist-Patient  
Privilege: Establishing a Certain and 
Principled Implied-Waiver Rule for  
Civil Rights Litigants 
Armen H. Merjian* 
Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later 
evaluation of the relative importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and the 
evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege. 
As we explained in Upjohn, if the purpose of the privilege is to be served, the 
participants in the confidential conversation “must be able to predict with some 
degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain 
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying 
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”1 
 
[W]e reject respondents’ contentions that anybody who requests damages for pain 
and suffering has waived the psychiatric privilege because the psychiatric records 
might conceivably disprove the experiencing of the pain and suffering, that any claim 
of even . . . “garden variety” injury waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege, and 
that a plaintiff’s mental health is placed in issue whenever the plaintiff’s claim for 
unspecified damages may include[] some sort of mental injury.2 
  
 
* Member, New York and Connecticut Bars. B.A. Yale University 1986; J.D. Columbia University 1990. 
The author is a civil rights and poverty lawyer at Housing Works, Inc., the largest provider of  
HIV/AIDS services in the State of New York. 
1. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1996) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449  
U.S. 383, 393 (1981)). 
2. Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 141 (2d Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Emotional distress damages are an essential element of most civil rights 
lawsuits. Indeed, such damages are often the sole means of compensating plaintiffs 
for the discrimination—the pain, humiliation, and psychological turmoil—that they 
have suffered.3 Civil rights claims thus implicate the most sensitive of human 
thoughts and emotions, ranging from sadness, shame, and humiliation to 
hopelessness, trauma, and suicidal ideation.4 Presenting evidence of this distress can 
be painful and scary, and it can revictimize the civil rights plaintiff, since it “entails 
reliving or even recreating a sense of powerlessness. Not only must the [plaintiff] 
 
3. See, e.g., Helen A. Anderson, The Psychotherapist Privilege: Privacy and “Garden Variety” 
Emotional Distress, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 117, 126 (2013) (“Compensatory damages for pain, 
suffering, and mental distress are often a major—if not the only—part of the damages sought [in civil 
rights cases].”); Deirdre M. Smith, An Uncertain Privilege: Implied Waiver and the Evisceration of the 
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 79, 84 (2008) (emotional 
distress damages “comprise a substantial proportion of civil matters in which plaintiffs seek recovery 
for personal injuries”); Victor M. Goode & Conrad A. Johnson, Emotional Harm in Housing 
Discrimination Cases: A New Look at a Lingering Problem, 30 FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 1143, 1157 (2003) 
(“[M]any victims must rely on their emotional harm claim as their primary basis for  
economic compensation.”). 
4. See Armen H. Merjian, Nothing “Garden Variety” About It: Manifest Error and Gross 
Devaluation in the Assessment of Emotional Distress Damages, 70 SYRACUSE. L. REV. 689, 692 (2020) 
(“Emotional distress can include humiliation, depression, embarrassment, frustration, anger, shock, and 
a host of other emotional or psychic harms, including trauma, lack of self-esteem, social isolation, loss 
of confidence, and diminished relationships. Emotional distress can also give rise to physical 
manifestations, including sleeplessness, nightmares, loss of appetite and weight loss, headaches, 
forgetfulness, tearfulness, stomach and chest pains, hives and skin rashes, hair loss, and even suicidal 
ideation and hopelessness.”). 
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describe her humiliation and despair, but the adequacy of her distress must be ruled 
upon by the judge or jury.”5 
Where the plaintiff has sought mental health treatment, the potential harm is 
even greater, for if mental health records can be discovered, the plaintiff’s most 
intimate and potentially embarrassing thoughts may be laid bare, quite possibly in a 
public forum.6 Recognizing the great sensitivity of these issues, the Supreme Court 
and all fifty states have established a psychotherapist-patient privilege.7 The 
question inevitably arises, however, whether and under what circumstances a 
plaintiff can be deemed to have waived this privilege. As commentators have noted, 
it is a question that “arises most frequently in the context of civil rights litigation.”8 
In Jaffee v. Redmond,9 the Supreme Court recognized a psychotherapist-patient 
privilege as a matter of federal common law. In a footnote, the Court suggested that 
the privilege might be waived, but aside from a single, limited example, the Court 
provided no guidance on this subject. Since Jaffee, both state and federal courts have 
addressed the “far-reaching question,”10 particularly for civil rights plaintiffs, 
whether merely stating a claim for emotional distress damages impliedly waives the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege. Several jurisdictions throughout the United 
States, however, have failed to establish a certain implied-waiver rule, and thus a 
certain privilege. Some have adopted “widely varying applications . . . [which] is little 
 
5. Susan Etta Keller, Does the Roof Have to Cave In?: The Landlord/Tenant Power Relationship 
and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1678 (1988). 
6. See, e.g., Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 (“Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for which 
individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential communications made during 
counseling sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace.”); Beth S. Frank, Note, Protecting the Privacy 
of Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs: The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege and Recovery of Emotional Distress 
Damages Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 639, 640 (2001) (“[B]ringing [sexual 
harassment actions] exposes women to intense examinations of their past sexual history, their personal 
life, and their mental stability. To tear further into the lives of sexual harassment victims, defendants 
will often request disclosure of plaintiffs’ mental health records.” (footnote omitted)). 
7. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12. 
8. Anderson, supra note 3, at 125; accord Smith, supra note 3, at 82 (federal civil rights cases 
provide “the context in which the issues of the psychotherapist-patient privilege and waiver issues 
generally arise”).  
9. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15 n.14. 
10. Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Frank, supra note 6, at 640 (“Whether 
damages for emotional distress serve as a waiver is especially important to sexual harassment plaintiffs 
seeking redress under the Civil Rights Act of 1991.”). 
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better than no privilege at all,”11 while others have failed to craft any  
rule whatsoever.12 
This Article addresses the issue of implied waiver under the most recent 
federal and state supreme court decisions. Its aim is to provide the comprehensive 
and thoughtful analysis that many courts and jurisdictions nationwide have failed to 
conduct on this seminal issue, and that practitioners may not have the time to 
undertake. Section II of this Article examines a recent and sadly typical case 
involving the issue of implied waiver in a civil rights case, highlighting the dangers 
of an uncertain rule and the urgent need for redress. Section III offers a critical 
analysis of the jurisprudence regarding implied waiver, with the first comprehensive 
look at federal circuit and state supreme court decisions on this issue. An assessment 
of the most recent decisions, together with the old, reveals that courts and 
commentators alike have overstated support for the “broad” approach to waiver. 
In fact, the majority of courts nationwide—and a sizeable majority of state supreme 
courts—have rejected that approach in favor of a narrower and more protective 
waiver rule. Section IV examines the issue of implied waiver in the state of New 
York as an exemplar, for unlike New York’s federal courts, New York’s state courts 
have yet to examine this issue. As the analysis concludes, New York must adopt an 
approach to privilege at least consonant with the federal standard, but preferably 
more narrow, for the narrow approach is the only approach that is both certain and 
rooted in established principles of waiver and privilege. A brief Conclusion follows. 
 
11. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17–18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)); 
see, e.g., Parisi v. Aneglicola, No. NNHCV176069235S, 2017 Conn. Super. LEXIS 10135, at *10, *13 
(Dec. 19, 2017) (noting varying approaches in Connecticut: “Several [courts] have thwarted efforts to 
force disclosure of protected records . . . . In contrast, many judges have compelled disclosure of 
records of plaintiff’s mental condition, where there was a ‘general’ or ‘garden variety’ claim of emotional 
distress.”); Auer v. City of Minot, 178 F. Supp. 3d 835, 844 (D.N.D. 2016) (“Within the Eighth Circuit, 
the federal district courts have taken differing positions with respect to whether one of the intermediate 
approaches can be taken in an appropriate case to foreclose discovery and later use of a plaintiff’s 
mental health records, including there being a divergence of opinion among the judges of the District 
of Minnesota.”); Prescott v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, No. 1:10-cv-00592 JLT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134137, 
at *16–17 n.5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2011) (“[D]istrict courts [in California] follow two approaches to 
determining whether the privilege has been waived. Some courts find a waiver of the privilege whenever 
emotional distress damages are sought. Others take a more narrow approach and find waiver only 
where emotional distress claims are more than mere ‘garden variety’ or incidental emotional distress 
damages claims.” (citations omitted)). 
12. See, e.g., N.D. v. Golden, No. 2:13cv540-MEF-TFM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60481, at *13 
(M.D. Ala. May 1, 2014) (“The Eleventh Circuit has been silent on the issue of implied waiver of 
psychotherapist/patient privilege . . . .”); Stallworth v. Brollini, 288 F.R.D. 439, 443 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(“[T]he Ninth Circuit has yet to consider the standard . . . .”); Bullock v. Smith, No. 3:05CV37-M-A, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104103, at *5 (N.D. Miss. March 28, 2006) (“[T]he Fifth Circuit has remained 
silent as to both the privilege itself and waiver of the privilege . . . .”); see infra Part IV. 
Clean Final Edit_Merjian.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/8/21  8:18 AM 
2021] IMPLIED WAIVER FOR CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGANTS 225 
I. INJUSTICE IN ACTION 
Linda Gomez,13 a Latina transgender woman, completed her statutory name 
change from a traditionally masculine first name in 2017.14 While Ms. Gomez was 
walking home through a New York City park one night in 2018, three police officers 
stopped her and proceeded to question her in English, even after she conveyed to 
the officers that she did not speak or understand English well. To be thorough,  
Ms. Gomez provided the officers with both her previous legal name and her current 
legal name. The officers arrested Ms. Gomez for trespassing in the park and took 
her to the police precinct. There, she explained through an interpreter why, as a 
transgender woman, she had provided both first names.15 
The officers then placed Ms. Gomez in a cell and handcuffed her to a bar or 
pipe using pink handcuffs. Every other individual who was handcuffed in the 
precinct had standard metal handcuffs.16 Throughout Ms. Gomez’s overnight 
detention, multiple officers refused to address her by her correct name and 
pronouns, utilizing “he” and “him” rather than “Linda,” “she,” or “her,” despite 
knowing that she was a transgender woman whose name was Linda. Multiple 
officers also “looked, gestured and laughed at Ms. [Gomez] in a mocking way” as 
she remained imprisoned in distinctive, pink handcuffs.17 To add insult to injury, 
Ms. Gomez was charged with “false personation,” i.e., knowingly misrepresenting 
her actual name to a police officer with the intent to prevent the officer from 
ascertaining the correct information.18 
The charges were later dismissed,19 and in January 2019, Ms. Gomez sued the 
City and the officers in question, inter alia, for violation of city and state human and 
civil rights laws. She claimed damages for “mental anguish, ongoing humiliation, 
and embarrassment due to those events,”20 citing numerous reports demonstrating 
that “transgender women in particular are a huge target for NYPD discrimination”21 
and that low-income transgender people of color “experience some of the most 
egregious cases of police brutality reported.”22 
At a preliminary court conference, defense counsel requested Ms. Gomez’s 
mental health records and demanded that she submit to an examination by 
 
13. The plaintiff’s name has been changed to protect her privacy. 
14. Complaint at ¶ 25, Gomez v. City of New York, No. 020841/2019E (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Jan. 22, 
2019) (A copy of the Complaint is on file with the author.). 
15. Id. ¶¶ 30–33. 
16. Id. ¶ 34. 
17. Id. ¶¶ 37–38. 
18. Id. ¶ 42. 
19. Id. ¶¶ 48–49. 
20. Id. ¶ 52. 
21. Id. ¶ 13 (citing CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., STOP AND FRISK: THE HUMAN 
IMPACT (2012), http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/the-human-impact-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KGZ9-MWH7]). 
22. Id. ¶ 11 (citing AMNESTY INT’L USA, STONEWALLED: POLICE ABUSE AND MISCONDUCT 
AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE IN THE U.S. 3 (2005), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr51/122/2005/en/ [https://perma.cc/5P6N-HV8S]). 
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defendants’ psychiatrist. Ms. Gomez’s counsel refused, arguing that she had only 
alleged “garden variety” emotional distress,23 with no intention to rely upon any 
mental health diagnoses or communications. Accordingly, she had not put her 
mental health records sufficiently at issue to waive the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege or to justify an examination. The judge disagreed, informing counsel that 
Ms. Gomez “can’t just demand money without proving she was injured”; that if she 
alleged emotional distress, then she had absolutely put her mental health in play; 
and that defendants’ requests would be granted. Before the court could issue a 
formal decision, however, the parties entered into negotiations and eventually 
settled the matter.24 
In stark contrast to the majority of both state and federal jurisdictions in the 
United States,25 including New York’s federal courts,26 and contrary to fundamental 
principles of waiver and privilege,27 the court in Gomez adopted the broadest  
(i.e., least protective) possible approach to implied waiver of the  
psychotherapist-patient privilege.28 The court failed to recognize that Ms. Gomez 
was perfectly capable of “proving she was injured” through her own testimony, and 
by inference from the awful treatment to which she was subjected, for “[d]amages 
for humiliation and emotional distress in civil rights cases . . . may be established 
by testimony or inferred from the circumstances.”29 In fact, the New York Court of 
Appeals (New York’s highest court) has expressly ruled that under the human rights 






23. See infra notes 52–58 and accompanying text for a discussion of “garden variety”  
emotional distress. 
24. E-mail from Gabriel Arkles, Senior Staff Att’y, ACLU LGBT & HIV Project, to Author 
(Aug. 7, 2020) (on file with the author). 
25. See infra Section III.A. 
26. See infra Section IV.A. 
27. See infra Parts III–IV. 
28. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
29. State ex rel. Dean v. Cunningham, 182 S.W.3d 561, 567 (Mo. 2006) (citation and internal 
quotations omitted); accord Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974) (“[H]umiliation 
can be inferred from the circumstances as well as established by the testimony.”); N.Y.C. Transit  
Auth. v. State Div. of Hum. Rts., 577 N.E.2d 40, 45 (N.Y. 1991) (emotional distress may be 
“corroborated by reference to the circumstances of the alleged misconduct”); Nieves v. Rojas, OATH 
Index No. 2153/17 Dec. & Ord., 12 (N.Y.C. Human Rights Comm’n May 16, 2019) (“While 
Complainant’s testimony about his experiences of emotional distress is somewhat limited, the 
Commission is also informed by evidence of the objective circumstances of his experience.”). 
30. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 577 N.E.2d at 45 (“[P]sychiatric or other medical treatment is not a 
precondition to recovery. Mental injury may be proved by the complainant’s own testimony, 
corroborated by reference to the circumstances of the alleged misconduct.”); Cullen v. Nassau  
Cnty. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 425 N.E.2d 858, 861 (N.Y. 1981) (emotional distress “may be established 
through the testimony of the complainant alone”). 
Clean Final Edit_Merjian.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/8/21  8:18 AM 
2021] IMPLIED WAIVER FOR CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGANTS 227 
 
The court also failed to consider that while Ms. Gomez’s emotional distress 
was at issue in the case, her privileged communications were not, for she had no  
intention of relying upon or introducing those communications in support of her 
claim. This is an all-too-common mistake: 
Those cases treating claims for incidental emotional damages as 
constituting waivers focus on relevancy and on the fact that emotional 
health is “in issue.” This disregards the fact that privileges operate 
notwithstanding relevancy and that the proper subject for the waiver 
analysis is whether the substance of a particular communication has been 
placed in issue, not whether the topic of communication is relevant to the 
factual issues of the case.31 
There are, in addition, strong policy arguments in favor of a narrower 
approach to implied waiver in civil rights cases. “[W]aiver implicates the important 
federal policy of vindicating civil rights,”32 along with similar state and local civil 
rights policies, as clearly expressed in the law.33 “To condition recovery for 
emotional distress incidental to the violation of federal constitutional and statutory 
rights upon the surrender of the protection of the psychotherapist privilege  
is . . . antithetical to the purpose of the laws that provide redress for such 
violations.”34 Indeed, as courts and commentators alike have concluded: 
[F]or policy reasons, a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege 
should not be narrowly construed [i.e., the privilege should not be narrowly 
construed], particularly in civil rights cases where Congress has placed 
much importance on litigants’ access to the courts and the remedial nature 
of such suits. . . . That purpose would be defeated were the broad or 
uncertain test of waiver applied and suits vindicating civil rights and 
seeking recovery for general damages thereby deterred.35 
 
31. Morrisette v. Kennebec Cnty., No. 01-01-B-S, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13309, at *4  
(D. Me. Aug. 21, 2001) (second emphasis added); accord Black v. Pan Am Labs, LLC,  
No. 1:07-CV-924, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126497, at *8 (W.D. Tex. July 8, 2008). See infra Part III for 
a full discussion of this issue. 
32. Anderson, supra note 3, at 120. 
33. See discussion infra notes 222–226 and accompanying text. 
34. Ruhlmann v. Ulster Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 194 F.R.D. 445, 451 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). 
35. Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 639 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (citations omitted); accord 
Ruhlmann, 194 F.R.D. at 451; Anderson, supra note 3, at 145 (“The need to further the public good of 
vindicating civil rights supports a narrow view of waiver.”); Smith, supra note 3, at 81 (“[C]ourts’ 
expansive view of waiver have resulted in a collision between plaintiffs’ efforts to vindicate their civil 
rights in federal court and defendants’ ability to exploit the issues that arise in plaintiffs’ mental health 
treatment to gain an advantage in litigation. However, in developing the waiver doctrine, courts utterly 
fail to weigh the potential impact on future plaintiffs’ decisions whether to pursue civil rights claims at 
all.”); Michael D’Ambrosio, Note, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Prison Litigation: How Can 
You Claim “Garden Variety” Emotional Distress When the Flowers Are Made Out of Steel?, 43 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 915, 953 (2016) (“[B]road views on waiver effectively chill civil rights litigation, especially for 
vulnerable populations who may have received mental health treatment in the past.”). 
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Civil rights statutes seek to convert victims of discrimination into “private 
attorneys general,”36 inter alia, by providing attorneys’ fees for successful litigants.37 
Broad waiver rules undermine these statutes by deterring victims from taking action, 
lest their most private mental health communications be revealed, and quite possibly 
used against them.38 This is the case even where, as in Gomez, the victims abjure any 
intention to use these communications in support of their claims. 
Finally, not only did the court signal its intent to forfeit Ms. Gomez’s 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, but the court approved of defendants’ demand 
for a psychological evaluation. A psychological exam is highly intrusive,  
even traumatic.39 
 
36. See, e.g., Dowdell v. Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Because civil rights 
litigants are often poor, and judicial remedies are often non-monetary, the Act shifts the costs of 
litigation from civil rights victim to civil rights violator. . . . [I]t provides an incentive to individuals to 
act as ‘private attorneys general,’ playing a significant role in the enforcement of important 
congressional policies.” (citations omitted)); Bell v. Helmsley, No. 111085/01, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 
537, at *16 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 4, 2003) (“[I]n civil rights cases there is an overriding transcending principle 
that plaintiffs in civil rights actions seek to vindicate the important civil and constitutional rights that 
cannot be valued in monetary terms. In short, each litigant is viewed as a private attorney general to 
encourage private enforcement for the public benefit . . . .”). 
37. See, e.g,, Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 95 (1989) (“The intention of Congress [in 
providing for attorneys’ fees] was to encourage successful civil rights litigation . . . .”); Northeast 
Women’s Ctr. v. McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466, 474 (3d Cir. 1989) (“The legislature considered that the 
potential recovery of attorneys’ fee in civil rights cases would encourage litigants to act as private 
attorneys general, vindicating the important policies behind our civil rights laws.”); Kerr v. Quinn, 692 
F.2d 875, 877 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The function of an award of attorney’s fees is to encourage the bringing 
of meritorious civil rights claims which might otherwise be abandoned because of the financial 
imperatives surrounding the hiring of competent counsel.”). 
38. See T.C. ex rel. S.C. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. 3:17-CV-01098; 
No. 3:17-CV-01159; No. 3:17-CV-01209; No. 3:17-CV-01277; No. 3:17-CV-01427, 2018  
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113517, at *32–33 (M.D. Tenn. July 9, 2018) (“[I]n the context of claims brought 
under anti-discrimination statutes, . . . the prospect of being required to undergo a physical or mental 
evaluation to vindicate protected rights might cause plaintiffs to abandon their claims. For this reason, 
courts are reluctant to find that a plaintiff places her mental condition ‘in controversy’ simply by making 
a claim of emotional distress.”); Taylor v. ABT Elecs., Inc., No. 05 C 576, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35819, 
at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2007) (“[A]llowing such discovery would discourage people from coming 
forward to bring these kinds of [discrimination] claims if as a result their whole life becomes an open 
book.” (internal quotations omitted)); Anderson, supra note 3, at 145 (“An additional public good is also 
implicated, however, in the context of federal civil rights lawsuits: the vindication of civil rights through 
citizens acting as ‘private attorneys general.’ . . . The law of implied waiver of the  
psychotherapist-patient privilege directly affects the enforcement mechanisms Congress has enacted.” 
(citation omitted)); D’Ambrosio, supra note 35, at 953 (“Under the broad view, courts force victims of 
mental or emotional injury to make a Hobson’s choice: pursue litigation and waive the privilege or do 
not pursue litigation at all. Such an approach undermines federal civil rights policy, which seeks to 
vindicate civil rights by making plaintiffs ‘private attorneys general.’”); Frank, supra note 6, at 663 (“If 
courts determine that a victim waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege is waived when she brings a 
civil rights action, then fewer victims will act as ‘private attorneys general’ for fear of invasion  
of privacy.”). 
39. See, e.g., Jones v. Perea, No. 05-644, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111263, at *11  
(D.N.M. Feb. 16, 2006) (“There can be no dispute that a psychological examination is intrusive.”); 
Privee v. Burns, 749 A.2d 689, 693 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (“[M]any people are likely to find unusually 
intrusive medical examinations, such as psychiatric and gynecological examinations, uncomfortable or 
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Indeed, it is among the most invasive kinds of examinations possible. 
Defendants seek, through a battery of tests and in-depth interviews, to peer 
into the recesses of [plaintiff’s] subconscious, to rummage through the 
closet of his psyche, and to search under the bed of his most private 
thoughts and feelings for evidence to challenge his claims.40 
This is particularly of concern to a transgender plaintiff such as Ms. Gomez, 
given the discrimination and hardship that the transgender community has 
experienced with mental health care providers.41 
For this reason, “courts must obviously treat the issue with great sensitivity,”42 
and they “are reluctant to find that a plaintiff places her mental condition ‘in 
controversy’ simply by making a claim of emotional distress.”43 In fact, the majority 
of courts to address this issue have concluded that a plaintiff asserting a “garden 
variety” emotional distress claim does not place her mental health sufficiently in 
controversy to justify a psychological evaluation.44 This includes New York’s federal 
 
even traumatic.”); Hirschheimer v. Associated Mins. & Mins. Corp., 94 Civ. 6155, 1995  
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18378, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1995) (“Psychological examinations are by their 
nature intrusive and implicate sensitive matters.”); Smith v. J.I. Case Corp., 163 F.R.D. 229, 232  
(E.D. Pa. 1995) (observing that “[t]he practice seems to be more and more in vogue of late for 
defendants to seek to partake of the in terrorem tactic of visiting upon a plaintiff a particularly intrusive 
incursion: examination by a psychiatrist, and other psychological delvings,” and holding that in “garden 
variety” cases, “psychiatric examination should be the exception, not the rule”); Kent D. Streseman, 
Note, Headshrinkers, Manmunchers, Moneygrubbers, Nuts & Sluts: Reexamining Compelled Mental 
Examinations in Sexual Harassment Actions Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 80 CORNELL  
L. REV. 1268, 1272 (1995) (“Compelled mental examinations may best serve defendants not by 
illuminating facts at issue in a case, but by intimidating potential sexual harassment plaintiffs into silence. 
The scope of such examinations can be dauntingly broad and invasive, permitting inquiry into the 
plaintiff’s entire psychological and sexual history.”). 
40. Jones, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111263, at *11. 
41. See, e.g., Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 611 (4th Cir. 2020) 
(“[B]eing transgender was pathologized for many years. As recently as the DSM-3 and DSM-4, one 
could receive a diagnosis of ‘transsexualism’ or ‘gender identity disorder,’ ‘indicat[ing] that the clinical 
problem was the discordant gender identity.’ Whereas ‘homosexuality’ was removed from the DSM in 
1973, ‘gender identity disorder’ was not removed until the DSM-5 was published in 2013.” (citation 
omitted)); Am. Psych. Ass’n, Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Transgender and Gender 
Nonconforming People, 70 AM. PSYCH. 832, 837 (2015), https://www.apa.org/practice/guidelines/
transgender.pdf [https://perma.cc/W35T-FRZY] (“In community surveys, TGNC [transgender and 
gender non-conforming] people have reported that many mental health care providers lack basic 
knowledge and skills relevant to care of TGNC people and receive little training to prepare them to 
work with TGNC people. The National Transgender Discrimination Survey reported that 50% of 
TGNC respondents shared that they had to educate their healthcare providers about TGNC care, 28% 
postponed seeking medical care due to antitrans bias, and 19% were refused care due to discrimination.” 
(citations omitted)). 
42. Privee, 749 A.2d at 693. 
43. T.C. ex rel. S.C., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113517, at *33; accord State v. Biehn,  
No. CR040202851T, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 690, at *6 (March 6, 2006) (“[G]iven the intrusive 
nature of a compelled psychiatric examination and the implication of various constitutional and 
statutory rights and privileges, the court should order such an examination only in circumstances 
deemed necessary to ensure fundamental fairness and the integrity of the justice system.”). 
44. T.C. ex rel. S.C., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113517, at *33 (“The majority of courts have held 
that plaintiffs do not place their mental condition in controversy merely by claiming damages for mental 
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courts,45 where federal law governs the issue of privilege, even when examining state 
and local civil rights claims.46 Hence, Ms. Gomez would not have been required to 
hand over her mental health records,47 or to submit to an intrusive psychological 
evaluation, if she had brought the same civil rights claims in federal rather than state 
court. She would also have avoided the difficulty and expense of securing her own 
expert (to rebut defendants’ psychiatrist), along with her own mental health provider 
(to testify as to her mental health records), significant burdens for litigants of limited 
means like Ms. Gomez.48 This unjust double standard unnecessarily complicates 




anguish or ‘garden variety’ emotional distress.” (citation and internal quotations omitted)); Lewis  
v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 286 P.3d 577, 579–80 (Mont. 2012) (“We have never ruled that a 
plaintiff’s claim for general emotional distress damages is, in and of itself, a sufficient basis for ordering 
a Rule 35 mental examination. In applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 35, [m]ost cases in which courts have ordered 
mental examinations pursuant to Rule 35(a) involve something more than just a claim of emotional 
distress. . . . We further conclude the District Court’s mistake of law in compelling Lewis to submit to 
an intrusive, unjustified psychological examination would cause a gross injustice.” (citation and internal 
quotations omitted)); LeGendre v. Cnty. of Monroe, 600 N.W.2d 78, 87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (“Most 
federal courts that have considered the ‘in controversy’ requirement . . . have held that a plaintiff in an 
employment discrimination case does not place the plaintiff’s mental condition ‘in controversy’ merely 
by alleging emotional distress or ‘garden-variety’ damages arising from the discrimination claim.”). 
45. See, e.g., Hartman v. Snelders, No. 04 CV 1784, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153876, at *60 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010) (“The general rule is that a claim for mere ‘garden-variety’ emotional damages 
does not place a plaintiff’s emotional state at issue.” (citations omitted)); Jarrar v. Harris, No. CV  
07-3299, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57307, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2008) (“Such intrusive discovery – a 
forced psychiatric examination to explore allegations that a plaintiff has experienced universally familiar 
emotions – is generally not available in comparable [i.e., “garden variety”] cases where a plaintiff claims 
to have been subjected to illegal discrimination and other civil rights violations by an employer.”). 
46. See, e.g., Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1987) (“The instant case is a 
federal question case by virtue of the RICO claim; and pendent state law claims arise in the case. 
Accordingly, we hold that the federal law of privilege controls the question whether the privileges 
asserted by Reynolds should be recognized.”); see also S. REP. NO. 93-1277 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059 n.16 (accompanying Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and stating: “it is also 
intended that the Federal Law of privileges should be applied with respect to pendent State law claims 
when they arise in a Federal question case.”). 
47. See infra Section IV.A. 
48. A large percentage of civil rights litigants are indigent. See, e.g., Dowdell v. Apopka, 698 F.2d 
1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 1983) (“[C]ivil rights litigants are often poor . . . .”); Kendall W. Hannon, Note, 
Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1841 (2008) (“Civil rights plaintiffs are overwhelmingly poor.”). Since 
fee-shifting statutes do not allow for pre-payment of expert witnesses, use of experts places such 
litigants at a disadvantage, and they “may be given access to the courts . . . only to have their claims 
dismissed because they cannot afford to bring along their evidence.” Kenneth R. Levine, Note, In 
Forma Pauperis Litigants: Witness Fees and Expenses in Civil Actions, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1464 
(1985); accord Reilly v. Berry, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (N.Y. 1929) (“[A] defendant may be at an unfair 
disadvantage, if he is unable because of poverty to parry by his own [expert] witness the thrusts of those 
against him.”); David Medine, The Constitutional Right to Expert Assistance for Indigents in Civil Cases, 
41 HASTINGS L.J. 282, 288 (1990) (“Without some form of assistance in these cases, an indigent is 
unable to assert legitimate claims or defenses solely because of her inability to hire an expert witness.”). 
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II. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND IMPLIED WAIVER OF THE  
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 
A privilege may be waived expressly or impliedly.49 A plaintiff impliedly waives 
her privilege when she “testifies concerning portions of the [privileged] 
communication,” when she “places the [privileged] relationship directly at issue,” 
and when she “asserts reliance on [the privileged communications] as an element of 
a claim or defense.”50 The question arises, then, whether a civil rights plaintiff 
impliedly waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege by interposing a claim for 
emotional distress damages incidental to a claim of discrimination. Courts generally 
take one of three approaches to answering this question: broad, “garden variety,” 
or narrow: 
(1) the broad approach—plaintiff waives the privilege merely by alleging 
emotional distress in the complaint; (2) the middle approach—plaintiff 
waives the privilege by alleging either a separate tort of distress or unusually 
severe emotional distress (i.e., more than “garden variety” emotional 
distress); or (3) the narrow approach—plaintiff waives the privilege by 
affirmatively relying on the psychotherapist-patient communication.51 
While the first and third categories are clearly delineated, the “garden variety” 
approach varies significantly from one court or jurisdiction to another.52 
Compounding this problem, some courts have defined the term ambiguously,  
e.g., as “the normal distress that would flow from an unpleasant experience.”53 In 
addition, the very term “garden variety,” and the labelling of emotional distress as 
either “normal” or, by implication, “abnormal,” is inaccurate, imprecise, and 
 
49. See, e.g., In re Sweet, 954 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Waiver may be express, or, as in 
this case, implied from conduct.”); Claudine V. Pease-Wingenter, Skating Too Close to the Edge: A 
Cautionary Tale for Tax Practitioners About the Hazards of Waiver, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 953, 965 (2013) 
(“In addition to actual waiver triggered by disclosures of privileged communications, certain uses of 
privileged materials can trigger an ‘implied waiver.’”). 
50. Pritchard v. Cnty. of Erie, 546 F.3d 222, 228 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 
51. Sponer v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 3:17-CV-02035-HZ, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
71739, at *3–4 (D. Or. Apr. 26, 2019) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Barnello v. Bayview Loan Servicing, 
LLC, No. 6:14-cv-1383-Orl-41TBS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199489, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2016) 
(explaining the “three different approaches to the question of waiver”). 
52. See, e.g., Flowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 225 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“The courts’ formulations 
vary, but the thought they seek to convey is the same.”); D’Ambrosio, supra note 35, at 957 (“The 
‘garden variety’ approach has no genus or species. It is often inconsistent.”). 
53. Lane v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 04-CV-683-CVE-PJC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5619, at *2  
(N.D. Okla. Jan. 25, 2007). 
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demeaning.54 (Accordingly, going forward, this Article will utilize the term “Tier 
One” in the place of “garden variety” wherever feasible.55) 
As a result, courts adopting a Tier One approach, including those that allude 
to “normal” distress, almost invariably add further elements to the definition. Some 
courts, for example, examine whether the plaintiff has alleged “complex” emotional 
distress, “such as that resulting in a specific psychiatric disorder.”56 Others find no 
waiver where the plaintiff “does not intend to introduce his medical records, and he 
will not rely on any medical lay or expert witness testimony.”57 Regardless of the 
definition adopted, however, the majority of both federal and state courts have 
eschewed the “broad” approach in favor of either the narrow or the Tier One 
approach, as the following discussion reveals. 
A. Implied Waiver of the Privilege in the Federal Courts 
Pursuant to Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, federal courts may 
craft new privileges by interpreting “common law principles . . . in the light of 
reason and experience.”58 Consonant with this rule, in Jaffee v. Redmond, the 
Supreme Court established an absolute psychotherapist-patient privilege59 as a 
 
54. See, e.g., Comm’n on Hum. Rts. & Opportunities v. Cantillon, No. HHBCV176039406, 2019 
Conn. Super. LEXIS 2696, at *2 n.3 (Oct. 2, 2019) (“The use of the term ‘garden variety’ to describe 
an emotional distress claim is somewhat objectionable in that it appears to unfairly demean the claim.”); 
Taylor v. City of Chicago, No. 14 C 737, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62620, at *21 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2016) 
(“[T]he phrase is inherently imprecise, leading to very different notions of what could grow in the 
garden.” (citation and internal quotations omitted)); Flowers, 274 F.R.D. at 225 (“The problem in these 
cases is definitional and stems from the imprecision and elasticity of the phrase ‘garden variety.’”); 
Merjian, supra note 4, at 693 (“Use of the term ‘garden variety’ for the first tier of emotional distress 
damages is as ubiquitous as it is unfortunate, demeaning as it is inaccurate. There is nothing ‘garden 
variety’ about the experience of discrimination. Discrimination is never ‘commonplace’ or ‘forgettable,’ 
common synonyms for this phrase.”); D’Ambrosio, supra note 35, at 958–59 (“Any concept that 
accounts for ‘normal’ mental or emotional distress must account for the accumulated experiences of 
discrimination and oppression. But, far too often, the decontextualized ordinary person bears the 
standard. As a result, ‘garden variety’ emotional distress effectively tells civil rights plaintiffs that 
something is wrong with them when they suffer more than the ‘reasonable dominant group.’”). 
55. See Merjian, supra note 4, at 696 (arguing that use of the term “garden variety” “should be 
abandoned . . . in favor of a simple, value-neutral nomenclature,” using “Tier One” in its place). This 
terminology is particularly applicable to New York law, under which there are three tiers of emotional 
distress damages. See infra note 190 and accompanying text. 
56. Sundberg v. Joint Apprenticeship Training Comm. of the Northwest Line  
Constr. Indus., No. 3:17-cv-01360-JR, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229977, at *4–5 (D. Or. July 24, 2019) 
(citations and internal quotations omitted). 
57. EEOC v. Big Five Corp., No. C17-1098RSM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85944, at *11  
(W.D. Wash. May 22, 2018). Although a Tier One case, these elements are essentially the same as those 
examined under the narrow approach (i.e., whether the plaintiff has waived the privilege by affirmatively 
relying on the psychotherapist-patient communications). See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
58. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996); see also FED. R. EVID. 501. 
59. See, e.g., Cappetta v. GC Servs. L.P., 266 F.R.D. 121, 127 (E.D. Va. 2009) (“The privilege is 
absolute in that it is not subject to any balancing test . . . .”); Consol. RNC Cases, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
40293, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2009) (“In Jaffee, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that the 
psychotherapist privilege should be subject to a balancing test – thereby implicitly recognizing it as an 
absolute rather than a qualified privilege.” (citation omitted)); Lewis M. Wasserman, The Psychotherapist 
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matter of federal common law.60 In so doing, the Court acknowledged “the  
general rule disfavoring testimonial privileges”61 but observed that “a  
psychotherapist-patient privilege will serve a public good transcending the normally 
predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.”62 The 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Court explained, 
is “rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust.” Treatment by 
a physician for physical ailments can often proceed successfully on the 
basis of a physical examination, objective information supplied by the 
patient, and the results of diagnostic tests. Effective psychotherapy, by 
contrast, depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which 
the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, 
emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the 
problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of 
confidential communications made during counseling sessions may cause 
embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of 
disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship 
necessary for successful treatment.63 
Without an unconditional privilege, the Court added, “confidential 
conversations between psychotherapists and their patients would surely be chilled, 
particularly when it is obvious that the circumstances that give rise to the need for 
treatment will probably result in litigation.”64 
Finally, the Court flatly rejected the notion that the rights of the patient should 
be balanced with the relevance and usefulness of the material in question. “Making 
the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of the 
relative importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for 
disclosure,” the Court explained, “would eviscerate the effectiveness of the 
privilege.”65 Instead, the Court opted for an absolute privilege:  
[I]f the purpose of the privilege is to be served, the participants in the 
confidential conversation must be able to predict with some degree of 
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain 
 
and the Attorney/Client Privileges as They Arise in Civil Rights Disputes, 26 TOURO L. REV. 579, 581 
(2010) (“Jaffee made it clear that the privilege is absolute.”); Ryan M. Gott, Note, The Evolving Treatment 
of “Garden-Variety” Claims Under the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 6 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL  
& APP. ADVOC. 91, 91 (2001) (“Since the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Jaffee v. Redmond, an 
absolute privilege exists at federal common law regarding the psychotherapist-patient relationship.” 
(footnote omitted)). Like other privileges, however, absolute privileges can be waived by the  
privilege-holder, and this is the crux of the issue addressed here. 
60. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 1. 
61. Id. at 9. 
62. Id. at 15. 
63. Id. at 10 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). 
64. Id. at 11–12. 
65. Id. at 17. 
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privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying 
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.66 
Notably, the Court failed to delineate the circumstances under which the 
privilege might be waived, merely observing in a footnote: “[W]e do not doubt that 
there are situations in which the privilege must give way, for example, if a serious 
threat of harm to the patient or to others can be averted only by means of a 
disclosure by the therapist.”67 Aside from this passage, the Court provided no 
guidance on whether, for example, a civil rights plaintiff impliedly waives the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege by interposing a claim for emotional distress 
damages. “It is evident from the comment,” however, “that the privilege is not to 
be readily waived. The Jaffee court describes an extreme situation under which harm 
to the patient or others is likely to occur if the confidential communication is not 
revealed.”68 
Since Jaffee, myriad federal courts have addressed the issue of implied waiver 
in both personal injury and civil rights contexts. While there is still no single 
approach to this issue, there is a clear consensus, with the majority rejecting the 
broad approach and adopting either a narrow or Tier One approach.69 This has, in 
fact, been the case for decades.70 It is important to note, moreover, that many of 
the cases cited in support of the broad approach are, upon closer scrutiny, far more 
narrow than they are at times portrayed. For example, in many of those cases, 
plaintiffs sought to introduce psychological records or communications, which 
 
66. Id. at 18 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
67. Id. at 18 n.19. 
68. Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614, 630–31 (S.D. Cal. 1999); accord Frank, supra 
note 6, at 663 (“Although the Court noted possible waiver of the privilege, the extreme situation used 
as an example implies that a simple claim of emotional distress would not warrant such a waiver.”); 
Gott, supra note 59 (“[T]he Supreme Court only expressed waiver by delineating extreme cases . . . .”); 
see also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408 n.3 (1998) (suggesting, under the analogous 
attorney-client privilege, that only “exceptional circumstances . . . might warrant breaching  
the privilege”). 
69. See, e.g., Johnson v. Rogers, No. 1:16-cv-02705-JMS-MPB, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233173, 
at *9 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 20, 2018) (“The majority of courts, adopting a ‘middle-ground,’ have held that 
claims of ‘garden variety’ emotional damage do not result in a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.” (citations omitted)); Kubik v. Cent. Mich. Univ. Bd. of Trs., No. 15-cv-12055, 2016  
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192612, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 17, 2016) (“Most courts have adopted a middle 
approach, which directs courts to inquire into the nature of the claims for mental or emotional 
distress.”); Pliego v. Hayes, 86 F. Supp. 3d 678, 691 (W.D. Ky. 2015) (“The majority rule is that where 
the plaintiff seeks ‘garden variety’ emotional damages . . . the [psychotherapist-patient] privilege remains 
intact and is not waived.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)). The same consensus governs the 
analogous question whether to order a mental examination under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See, e.g., Kuminka v. Atlantic Cnty., 551 Fed. Appx. 27, 29 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The general 
consensus is that ‘garden variety’ emotional distress allegations that are part and parcel of the plaintiff’s 
underlying claim are insufficient to place the plaintiff’s mental condition ‘in controversy’ for purposes 
of Rule 35(a).” (citations and internal quotations omitted)). 
70. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 551, 553 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (declaring, 
twenty years ago, “[t]he majority of courts have held that plaintiffs do not place their mental condition 
in controversy merely by claiming damages for mental anguish or ‘garden variety’ emotional distress” 
(citations omitted)). 
Clean Final Edit_Merjian.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/8/21  8:18 AM 
2021] IMPLIED WAIVER FOR CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGANTS 235 
would waive the privilege even under a narrow approach.71 Others sought damages 
for specific, diagnosable psychic injuries, or for “severe” emotional distress, which 
would waive the privilege under most Tier One formulations.72 
Similarly, courts and commentators have been too quick to announce the 
adoption of a broad rule in several federal circuits, including the Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.73 A close reading of the relevant cases, and a review of 
the developments following each of those decisions, provided below, reveals an 
interesting fact: not one of these circuits, and thus not one circuit in the country, 
has definitively adopted a broad approach. The subsequent adoption of narrower 
approaches by district courts in all four of these circuits makes this abundantly clear. 
In Maday v. Public Libraries,74 the Sixth Circuit examined the question whether 
plaintiff Maday waived her privilege as to records of her meeting with a social 
worker, some of which “were initially introduced by Maday herself, as proof of the 
emotional distress damages that she was seeking under Michigan law.”75 In broad 
language, the Sixth Circuit observed that “if Maday were not seeking  
emotional-distress damages, then her conversations with a social worker about how 
she was feeling would likely be privileged. But when Maday put her emotional state 
at issue in the case, she waived any such privilege, and the records may come 
 
71. See id. at 556 (“[U]pon close inspection, many of the cases purporting to reject the narrow 
view and adopt a broad view actually take a middle ground.” (citations omitted)); Hucko v. City of Oak 
Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 528 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (“A number of other district courts have held that 
allegations of emotional pain and suffering can impliedly waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege, 
but in factual contexts where—unlike in this case—the plaintiff sought to offer evidence from 
psychotherapists to bolster that claim.” (citations omitted)); Fritsch, 187 F.R.D. at 629 (“[I]n a number 
of the cases in which courts found waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the party claiming 
the privilege intended to call his or her psychotherapist as a witness, or otherwise put the substance of 
psychotherapist-patient communications directly at issue.” (citations omitted)). 
72. See Ruhlmann v. Ulster Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 194 F.R.D. 445, 449 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(“A close reading, however, reveals that many of the cases espousing the broad view distinguish between 
cases in which significant emotional harm is alleged or the mental condition is at the heart of the 
litigation, and a claim for ‘garden-variety’ emotional distress damages.”); see also infra notes 90, 97 and 
accompanying text. 
73. See, e.g., Laudicina v. City of Crystal Lake, 328 F.R.D. 510, 518 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“[The 
Seventh Circuit in] Oberweis adopted the broad approach to waiving the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege, and this Court is bound by that decision.”); Magney v. Truc Pham, 466 P.3d 1077, 1093 
(Wash. 2020) (McCloud, J., dissenting) (noting that the Eighth Circuit decision in Schoffstall is “often 
cited as an example of the broad approach”); Ostler v. Harris, No. 2:18-cv-00254, 2019  
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217687, at *6 n.1 (D. Utah Dec. 17, 2019) (“The court recognizes that some courts 
in other districts are citing to [the Tenth Circuit’s decision in] Fisher to support the proposition that a 
plaintiff waives privilege merely by making a claim for emotional distress damages.”); D’Ambrosio, 
supra note 35, at 936 (“The Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits have adopted a ‘broad’ view as 
to waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.”) (In fairness, the author did note that at least in the 
Seventh and Eighth Circuits, “subsequent district court decisions have embraced the ‘garden variety’ 
view.” Id. at 957); Smith, supra note 3, at 110 (“Three federal courts of appeals [i.e., the Sixth, Seventh, 
and Eighth] follow the broad approach, but none has offered close analysis of the controversy in the 
lower courts.”). 
74. Maday v. Pub. Librs., 480 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2007). 
75. Id. at 820. 
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in . . . .”76 The court concomitantly concluded, however, that “[t]his is a clear 
example of voluntary disclosure of privileged information,” and thus her privilege 
had “clearly been waived.”77 
The court did not address the question whether a claim for Tier One damages 
might preserve the privilege, and the finding that voluntary disclosure of privileged 
communications effectuates a waiver is, in fact, consonant with the narrow 
approach to waiver.78 Accordingly, since Maday, numerous district courts in the 
Sixth Circuit have rejected the broad approach in favor of the Tier One approach.79 
Prewitt v. Hamline University is illustrative: 
The Sixth Circuit holds that a plaintiff waives the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege by putting his emotional state at issue in a case. Maday v. Public 
Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 2007). A majority of courts 
find an exception to that waiver, however, when the plaintiff alleges only 
“garden-variety” emotional distress and does not allege “a separate tort for 
the distress, any specific psychiatric injury or disorder, or unusually severe 
distress.” . . . Here, Prewitt’s claim falls under the “garden variety” 
umbrella. Prewitt does not bring a claim of negligent or intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. The record contains no indication that he 
anticipates expert proof to support his claim of “mental anguish,” nor does 
Prewitt plead any facts that might support a finding that his mental anguish 
has been “unusually severe.” On this record, it appears that Prewitt has not 
 
76. Id. at 821 (citations omitted). 
77. Id. 
78. The court also approved of the lower court’s use of a “balancing” test for the admission of 
the “probative” emotional distress evidence. Id. at 821–22. This contravenes fundamental precepts 
governing privilege, and the Supreme Court’s express rejection of a balancing test in Jaffee. See supra 
notes 66–67, 270 and accompanying text. 
79. See, e.g., T.C. ex rel. S.C. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty.,  
No. 3:17-CV-01098; No. 3:17-CV-01159; No. 3:17-CV-01209; No. 3:17-CV-01277;  
No. 3:17-CV-01427, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113517, at *33 (M.D. Tenn. July 9, 2018); Prewitt  
v. Hamline Univ., No. 3:15-cv-0942, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181167, at *6–7 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 3, 2018), 
aff’d No. 3:15-cv-00942, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107278 (M.D. Tenn. June 27, 2018), aff’d 764  
Fed. Appx. 524 (6th Cir. 2019); Maysey v. Henkel Corp., No. 1:17cv-00108-GNS, 2018  
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2211, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 5, 2018); Bose v. Roberto De La Salud Bea & Rhodes 
Coll., No. 2:16-cv-02308-JTF-tmp, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231604, at *10–11 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 9, 
2017) (“[T]his Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that under the middle-ground approach, 
waiver is not appropriate here because Plaintiff has not placed her mental condition at issue.”); Kubik 
v. Cent. Mich. Univ. Bd. of Trs., Case No. 15-cv-12055, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111318, at *9  
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2016) (“When a plaintiff waives the right to recover damages for more than 
‘garden-variety’ emotional distress, the plaintiff retains the psychotherapist-patient privilege.” (citations 
omitted)); Santifer v. Inergy Auto. Sys., LLC, No. 5:15-cv-11486, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45493, at *6 
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 4, 2016); Mason v. Wal-Mart Corp., No. 2:14-cv-446, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113960, 
at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 2015); Atkins v. Lq Mgmt., No. 3-13-0562, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205230, 
at *12 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2014) (acknowledging Maday, but adopting Tier One approach where 
“plaintiffs have asserted only garden-variety claims of emotional distress”); Lamb v. Hazel,  
No. 5:12-CV-00070-TBR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50238, at *20 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 8, 2013) (“At this 
juncture, Plaintiff’s mental health is not at issue because he appears to raise only garden-variety claims 
of mental or emotional injury. His mental health records remain privileged, and Defendants are not 
entitled to a medical release authorization.”). 
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placed his mental health “in controversy” so as to overcome the privilege 
afforded his mental health records and require their production.80 
In Doe v. Oberweis Dairy,81 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
decision allowing access to the plaintiff’s psychiatric records, broadly opining that 
“[i]f a plaintiff by seeking damages for emotional distress places his or her 
psychological state in issue, the defendant is entitled to discover any records of that 
state.”82 This is, however, tautologous, for the seminal question is when, precisely, a 
plaintiff places her mental state at issue and whether a narrow or Tier One strategy 
by plaintiff preserves the privilege. The court never addressed these issues83 and 
likened the psychotherapist-patient privilege to the doctor-patient privilege, despite 
the fact that the latter privilege is not even recognized under federal law.84 The court 
also suggested that the lower court might limit the use of plaintiff’s psychiatric 
records at trial “to the extent that the plaintiff’s interest in privacy outweighs the 
probative value of the information contained in the records.”85 This is plainly 
contrary to Jaffee, in which the Supreme Court expressly rejected the use of a 
balancing test in determining the privilege. 
Not surprisingly, given the ambiguous and flawed nature of the Oberweis 
decision, district courts in the Seventh Circuit “have been hesitant to apply the 
broad approach. Instead, in various decisions that cite Oberweis, courts have gone 
on to apply either the garden-variety approach or the narrow approach.”86 
In Schoffstall v. Henderson,87 the Eighth Circuit perfunctorily ruled that 
“plaintiff waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege by placing his or her medical 
condition at issue.”88 The court provided no analysis of the relevant issues, never 
 
80. Prewitt, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181167, at *6–7. 
81. Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2006). 
82. Id. at 718. 
83. See, e.g., Flowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 224 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“Although the district 
court in Oberweis Dairy had discussed ‘garden variety’ emotional damages and cited [a Tier One case], 
the Seventh Circuit’s affirmance . . . neither mentioned [the case] nor used the phrase ‘garden variety.’” 
(citations omitted)). 
84. Oberweis, 456 F.3d at 718 (“[T]here is a psychotherapist-patient privilege in federal  
cases . . . like the closely related doctor-patient privilege . . . .”); see Anderson, supra note 3, at 131 (“The 
court’s premises are faulty. Jaffee analogized to the attorney-client privilege, and the Court has not 
recognized a doctor-patient privilege.”) 
85. Oberweis, 456 F.3d at 718 (citations omitted). 
86. Taylor v. City of Chicago, No. 14 C 737, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133715, at *7  
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2016); see, e.g., Awalt v. Marketti, 287 F.R.D. 409, 418 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“[C]laims for 
‘garden variety’ emotional distress damages do not waive the privilege.”); Noe v. R.R. Donnelley  
& Sons, No. 10 C 2018, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39492, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2011) (“[T]he Court 
finds that Noe’s allegations concerning emotional harm constitute a garden variety distress claim that 
does not place his psychological state at issue in such a way that would waive the  
psychotherapist-patient privilege.”); Flowers, 274 F.R.D. 218; Kronenberg v. Baker & McKenzie LLP, 
747 F. Supp. 2d 983 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Taylor v. ABT Elecs., Inc., No. 05 C 576, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
35819, at *4-6 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2007). 
87. Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2000). 
88. Id. at 823 (citations omitted); see Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 390 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Schoffstall 
“does not explain what it might mean to place one’s mental condition in issue”). 
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once mentioning the term “garden variety” or acknowledging the questions 
implicated by a broad versus more narrow approach. In addition, the plaintiff in 
Schoffstall alleged “extreme emotional distress,”89 which would waive the privilege 
even under a Tier One approach.90 As one district court has observed: 
[I]n Schoffstall, the court characterized plaintiff as claiming “extreme 
emotional distress” and did not address whether an intermediate approach 
would be appropriate in cases when severe distress is not being claimed. 
Further, . . . one of the four cases cited by the Eighth Circuit . . . (Jackson 
v. Chubb. Corp.) was a case where the court concluded that, although the 
broad approach to waiver of the Jaffee privilege applies, the plaintiff could 
avoid discovery if she limited her claim for damages to recovery for garden 
variety emotional distress.91 
As a result, numerous district courts in the Eighth Circuit have since ruled that 
plaintiffs do not place their mental health at issue, and thus do not waive the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, by asserting Tier One emotional-distress claims.92 
Finally, in Fisher v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,93 the Tenth Circuit ruled 
that plaintiff’s “request for emotional-distress damages placed her psychological 
state in issue and entitled [defendant] to discover her therapy records.”94 The court 
cited Oberweis and Schoffstall, and like both of those cases, provided no analysis, 
failing even to mention the term “garden variety” or to acknowledge the issues at 
 
89. Schoffstall, 223 F.3d at 822. 
90. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 131 (“In fact, the outcomes in both Schoffstall and [Oberweis] 
can be squared with the garden variety—or even a narrow—approach.”). 
91. Auer v. City of Minot, 178 F. Supp. 3d 835, 843–44 (D.N.D. 2016) (citations omitted). 
92. See, e.g., Uyin Jildo Alau v. Morse, No. 3:16-cv-250; No. 3:16-cv-251; No. 3:16-cv-252, 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232891, at *8 (D.N.D. Jan. 29, 2018) (“They will also be prohibited from offering 
any evidence of emotional distress, other than ‘garden variety’ emotional distress.”); Feinwachs  
v. Minn. Hosp. Ass’n, Case No. 11-cv-8, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25109, at *7–8 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 
2018) (utilizing Tier One approach to conclude that plaintiff “has not placed his medical condition at 
issue”); Williams v. Perdue, No. 4:17-cv-01531-JAR, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122341, at *2 n.1  
(E.D. Mo. July 23, 2018) (“Garden variety emotional distress does not put a Plaintiff’s medical 
condition in controversy, and therefore a plaintiff does not waive the privilege to her medical records.”); 
Auer, 178 F. Supp. 3d at 844–45 (“[T]he undersigned concludes it would find persuasive at least the 
position taken by the federal district court in Santelli, i.e., a civil rights plaintiff’s mental health records 
are either not relevant or of such marginal relevance that they should not be subject to discovery and 
later use if plaintiff: (1) limits his or her claim to recovery of damages for hurt feelings, humiliation, 
anger, and embarrassment; (2) does not offer evidence of treatment or of any resulting physical 
manifestation; and (3) relies only upon his or her own testimony to support the claim.”); Williams  
v. Feeney, No. 8:13CV287, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52757, at *11 (D. Neb. Apr. 22, 2015) (“It is clear 
that when the plaintiff pleads emotional distress, it is a ‘garden-variety’ claim that does not constitute a 
waiver of the privilege by the plaintiff.” (citation omitted)); Womack v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 275 
F.R.D. 571, 572 (D. Minn. 2011) (“But, ‘allegations of “garden variety emotional distress,” . . . are 
insufficient to place her mental condition in controversy.’” (citation and internal quotations omitted)); 
Miles v. Century 21 Real Est. LLC, No. 4:05-CV-1088 GTE, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67974, at *19–20 
(E.D. Ark. Sept. 21, 2006) (“Considering Plaintiffs’ representations that they will not offer these 
counseling records or expert testimony to prove their emotional distress claims, Plaintiffs have met 
their burden to show that they have not waived the psychiatrist-patient privilege.”). 
93. Fisher v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 361 Fed. App’x. 974 (10th Cir. 2010). 
94. Id. at 978. 
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play.95 In addition, the lower court ruling affirmed in Fisher noted that the plaintiff 
claimed “extreme emotional distress” and ruled that her claims “appear inconsistent 
with Plaintiff’s allegations of only ‘garden variety’ emotional distress.”96 Fisher, then, 
hardly established a clear, broad rule, and as a result, numerous district courts in the 
Tenth Circuit have since adopted a Tier One approach.97 
By contrast, along with the myriad and majority of district court cases adopting 
a narrower approach, both the Second and the D.C. Circuits have expressly adopted 
a Tier One and narrow approach, respectively.98 
B. Implied Waiver of the Privilege in the State Supreme Courts 
A strong majority of state supreme courts examining waiver and the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege have rejected the broad approach. This includes 
the Supreme Courts of Alabama,99 Alaska,100 Colorado,101 Missouri,102 New 
 
95. Id. at 977–78. See Ostler v. Harris, No. 2:18-cv-00254, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217687, at *7 
(D. Utah Dec. 17, 2019) (“The middle ground approach is the majority approach. The Tenth Circuit 
does not appear to have spoken on this issue after Jaffee . . . .”). 
96.  Fisher v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., No. 07-CV-433-CVE-SAJ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133226, at 
*7–8 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 29, 2008). See Ostler, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217687, at *6 n.1 (“[U]pon further 
review, the court notes that the 10th Circuit in Fisher agreed with the lower court’s ruling, in which the 
plaintiff made claims for extreme emotional distress . . . . Plaintiff’s claims in the lower court were 
sufficient to find waiver [i.e., under a Tier One approach].”). 
97. See, e.g., Ostler, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217687, at *7–8 (“Plaintiff asserts mere garden-variety 
claims of emotional distress. . . . Thus, the court finds Plaintiff did not put Ms. Ostler’s mental state in 
issue in this case . . . .”); Cribari v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 16-cv-02450-NRN, 2018  
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228365, at *8–9 (D. Colo. Sept. 13, 2018) (“To the extent that Ms. Cribari’s position 
at trial will be that ‘Plaintiff will not present any evidence of Plaintiff’s psychological diagnoses,’  
Ms. Cribari is free to make an appropriate objection to the introduction of therapy record evidence at 
that time.” (citation omitted)); Gordon v. T.G.R. Logistics, Inc., 321 F.R.D. 401, 404 (D. Wyo. 2017) 
(“In issuing this order the court recognized that such discovery was appropriate for alleged severe 
emotion distress, as opposed to ‘garden variety’ emotional distress.”); Thompson v. TCI  
Prods. Co., No. 13-CV-824-CVE-PJC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143812, at *7–8 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 9, 
2014) (“[W]here the survivor’s grief and emotional distress from the loss of the decedent is limited to 
the sort of ‘generic’ or ‘garden variety’ claim of the sort that would be suffered by an ordinary person 
in similar circumstances, the privilege has not been waived.”); Kear v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc.,  
No. 12-cv-1235-JAR-KGG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84943, at *9 (D. Kan. June 18, 2013) (“‘Garden 
variety’ emotional distress can exempt a plaintiff from being subjected to a mental examination. It may 
also prevent disclosure of information protected under psychotherapist-patient privilege.” (citations 
omitted)); EEOC v. Fisher Sand & Gravel Co., No. CV 09-0309 MV/WPL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
146973, at *7 (D.N.M. Mar. 4, 2010) (ruling, two months after Fisher : “In this case, the EEOC denies 
that it intends to use any of Encinias’s doctors or medical evidence to support its claims. Accordingly, 
the EEOC was not required to provide the names of Encinias’s medical and mental health providers, 
her medical records, or medical releases with its initial disclosures.”). 
98. See Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2008); Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384 (D.C. Cir. 2007); 
discussion infra Section IV.A. (analyzing Sims). 
99. Ex parte W. Mental Health Ctr., 884 So. 2d 835 (Ala. 2003). 
100. Kennedy v. Mun. of Anchorage, 305 P.3d 1284 (Alaska 2013). 
101. Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1999). 
102. State ex rel. Dean v. Cunningham, 182 S.W.3d 561 (Mo. 2006). 
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Hampshire,103 New Jersey,104 Oklahoma,105 Texas,106 and Washington.107 In 
Kinsella, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that where “expert medical testimony 
is not required to prove the effect of the defendant’s behavior,” an allegation of 
extreme cruelty “does not put the plaintiff’s mental condition in sufficient issue” to 
justify a court-ordered psychological examination.108 As to defendant’s request for 
plaintiff’s psychotherapy records, the court similarly adopted a narrow approach, 
noting that “Plaintiff is not seeking to introduce any evidence related to his 
treatment by [his treating psychologist]” and “intends to rely for his proof of 
extreme cruelty on proof of the alleged acts of defendant . . . and his own testimony 
concerning their emotional effects on him.”109 
Of the remaining eight state supreme courts to reject the broad approach, 
Alaska, Colorado, Missouri, and New Hampshire have expressly adopted a Tier One 
approach.110 The Alabama Supreme Court has ruled that there is no implied waiver 
or “exception” to the psychotherapist-patient privilege where “the plaintiff merely 
alleges mental anguish.”111 In addition, the court ruled that there is no exception to 
the privilege where a party merely “seeks information relevant to the issue of the 
proximate cause of another party’s injuries.”112 The court did not, however, specify 
whether the narrow or Tier One approach should govern. 
In R.K. v. Ramirez,113 the Texas Supreme Court examined the question of 
waiver under a patient-litigant exception114 adopted in 1988 that expressly provides 
 
103. Desclos v. S. N.H. Med. Ctr., 903 A.2d 952 (N.H. 2006). 
104. Kinsella v. Kinsella, 696 A.2d 556 (N.J. 1997). 
105. Ellis v. Gurich, 73 P.3d 860 (Okla. 2003). 
106. R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1994). 
107. Magney v. Pham, 466 P.3d 1077 (Wash. 2020). 
108. Kinsella, 696 A.2d at 574. 
109. Id. at 576. 
110. See Kennedy v. Mun. of Anchorage, 306 P.3d 1284, 1285 (Alaska 2013) (“[W]e conclude 
that the assertion of garden-variety mental anguish claims in an employment discrimination case does 
not automatically waive the physician and psychotherapist privilege.”); Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 
152, 153 (Colo. 1999). (“[W]e hold that by making generic claims for damages for mental anguish, 
emotional distress, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life that are incident to her physical 
injuries and that do not exceed the suffering and loss an ordinary person would likely experience in 
similar circumstances, Johnson has not impliedly waived her statutory physician-patient and 
psychotherapist-client privileges to keep these sensitive records private. Therefore, we now make the 
rule absolute.”); State ex rel. Dean v. Cunningham, 182 S.W.3d 561, 568 (Mo. 2006) (“[E]vidence of 
Dean’s medically or psychologically diagnosable mental or physical condition is irrelevant to the 
question of whether she suffered ‘garden variety’ emotional distress as a result of the incidents pleaded 
in her sex discrimination and sexual harassment claims. Her particular past or present mental condition, 
in that respect, is not in controversy.”); Desclos v. S. N.H. Med. Ctr., 903 A.2d 952, 960 (N.H. 2006) 
(“If, however, the mental suffering that [plaintiff] claims involves only generic mental suffering, then 
such claims would not waiver her psychotherapist-patient privilege.”). 
111. Ex parte W. Mental Health Ctr., 884 So. 2d 835, 841 (Ala. 2003). 
112. Id. (quoting Ex parte Pepper, 794 So. 2d 340, 344 (Ala. 2001) 
113. R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1994). 
114. Although they are phrased differently, patient-litigant exceptions typically allow disclosure 
of privileged information where plaintiffs put their mental health conditions at issue. See, e.g., Vahai  
v. Gertsch, 455 P.3d 1218, 1240 (Wy. 2020) (Gray, J., concurring) (“The patient-litigant exception 
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an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege “as to a communication or 
record relevant to an issue of the physical, mental or emotional condition of a 
patient in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as part of the 
party’s claim or defense.”115 Rejecting the broad approach,116 the court ruled that 
the exception applies 
[w]hen a party’s condition relates in a significant way to a party’s claim or 
defense. Communications and records should not be subject to discovery 
if the patient’s condition is merely an evidentiary or intermediate issue or 
fact, rather than an “ultimate” issue for a claim or defense, or if the 
condition is merely tangential to a claim rather than “central” to it.117 
The court also rejected a test based merely upon relevance, “because such a 
test would ignore the fundamental purpose of evidentiary privileges, which is to 
preclude discovery and admission of relevant evidence under  
prescribed circumstances.”118 
The court’s rejection of a broad, automatic waiver, and its focus upon whether 
the emotional condition is “merely an evidentiary or intermediate issue or fact,” or 
“merely tangential” rather than central, echoes the Tier One approach. Under this 
approach, claims for emotional distress that are merely “incidental” to the plaintiff’s 
claim of, e.g., discrimination, do not waive the privilege.119 And indeed, following 
R.K., Texas courts have adopted a Tier One approach to the question of  
implied waiver.120 
 
allows disclosure of otherwise privileged communications in cases where the patient’s mental health is 
at issue.”). 
115. R.K., 887 S.W.2d at 840–41 (emphasis omitted) (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 509(d)(4), 
510(d)(5)). 
116. See id. at 843 (“[T]his test prevents the privilege from evaporating as a matter of course 
simply because a lawsuit has been filed.”); John Matney, Note, What’s It Worth? The Patient-Litigant 
Exception Whittles Away at the Physician-Patient and Mental Health Information Privileges: R.K.,  
M.D. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1994), 26 TEX. TECH L. REV. 993, 1006 (1995) (noting that 
the R.K. decision is “not as broad as opinions which allow for discovery of medical information any 
time any party merely makes mention of the patient’s medical condition in its claim or defense”). 
117. R.K., 887 S.W.2d at 842. 
118. Id. at 842 (citation omitted); see also Coates v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Tex. 1988) 
(holding, under a now-superseded rule governing mental examinations: “A routine allegation of mental 
anguish or emotional distress does not place the party’s mental condition in controversy. The plaintiff 
must assert mental injury that exceeds the common emotional reaction to an injury or loss”). 
119. See, e.g., Diunugala v. Dep’t of Conservation, No. CV 16-03530-DSF, 2018  
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229721, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2018) (“Garden variety emotional distress is ordinary 
or commonplace emotional distress that is simple and usual or incidental.”); Malowsky v. Schmidt,  
No. 3:15-CV-666, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229306, at *6–7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2017) (“Nor will the 
assertion of a mere ‘garden variety’ claim for emotional distress—such as that the plaintiff suffered less 
acute mental injury or generalized emotional distress that was merely ‘incidental’ to defendant’s alleged 
conduct—give rise to forfeiture.” (citation omitted)); Morrisette v. Kennebec Cnty., No. 01-01-B-S, 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13309, at *3 (D. Me. Aug. 21, 2001) (“These same cases held that the mere 
assertion of a damages claim for ‘garden variety’ or ‘incidental’ emotional distress is not sufficient to 
constitute waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.”). 
120. See, e.g., In re Williams, No. 10-08-00364-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 1561, at *13–14, *19 
(Mar. 4, 2009) (“A claim for mental anguish or emotional distress will not, standing alone, make a 
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In Ellis v. Gurich, the Oklahoma Supreme Court examined the question of 
waiver under a patient-litigant exception to the privilege “as to a communication 
relevant to the physical, mental or emotional condition of the patient in any 
proceeding in which the patient relies upon that condition as an element of the 
patient’s claim or defense.”121 The lower court had “concluded that the mere ‘filing’ 
of the underlying action placed [petitioners’] . . . mental or emotional condition in 
issue, making their mental health care history, if any, discoverable.”122 Petitioners 
asserted, however, that “with respect to grief, loss of companionship, and the like, 
no expert witnesses are expected to testify.”123 Rejecting the broad approach, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court explained that petitioners “do not rely upon their mental 
or emotional conditions as an element of their claims within the meaning of [the 
Oklahoma statute],” and thus defendants were not entitled to “discovery of 
psychiatrists, psychologists, therapists and/or counselors,” or to “discovery of the 
mental health care history, if any, of petitioners.”124 
The recent decision of the Washington Supreme Court is more complicated 
(and, frankly, convoluted). In Magney v. Pham,125 the court examined the “marital 
counseling privilege” in connection with a claim of medical malpractice.126 The 
court rejected the broad approach, ruling that there is no “automatic waiver of 
privilege” when filing a claim involving mental anguish.127 The decision is otherwise 
of limited usefulness to our inquiry, however, and distinguishable for several 
reasons. First, this was not a civil rights claim but a “medical negligence claim.”128 
 
plaintiff’s mental or emotional condition a part of the plaintiff’s claim. . . . [T]he testimony merely raises 
routine allegations of mental anguish resulting from his mother’s death and does not address a mental 
injury exceeding a common emotional reaction to such a loss.” (citations omitted)); In re Doe, 22 S.W.3d 
601, 610 (Tex. App. 2000) (“[S]he has not alleged any ‘severe emotional condition’ that would place her 
mental condition at issue so as to trigger the litigation exception and waive her privilege regarding her 
mental health records. . . . To hold otherwise would suggest that every time a plaintiff raises a claim for 
past and future mental anguish damages her mental condition would be in issue and thereby all mental 
health records would be discoverable.”). 
121. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2503(D)(3) (2021). 
122. Ellis v. Gurich, 73 P.3d 860, 860 (Okla. 2003) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted); accord Moody v. Ford Motor Co.,  
No. 03-CV-784-JOE-PJC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42659, at *3–5 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 10, 2005); Baylon 
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CIV 12-0052, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191255, at *4 (D.N.M. Dec. 26, 2013) 
(agreeing with plaintiffs’ argument “that because they will not call any medical experts or rely on Cruz 
Baylon’s medical records at trial as to his emotional distress damages claim, a release for his medical 
and mental health records was not required under [district court statute requiring disclosure ‘[i]n all 
cases in which the physical or mental medical condition of a party is an issue’]”); see  
D.N.M. LR-Civ. 26.3(d). 
125. Magney v. Pham, 466 P.3d 1077 (Wash. 2020). 
126. Id. at 1080. 
127. Id. at 1083; see id. at 1089 (McCloud, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Respondents assert that the Magneys automatically waived privilege simply by filing a lawsuit in which 
they seek damages for mental anguish. The majority rejects that assertion, and I agree.”); id. at 1094 
(McCloud, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]e have already rejected the  
broad approach . . . .”). 
128. Id. at 1083. 
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Second, as the court acknowledged, “the marital counseling privilege is not 
sufficiently analogous to the psychologist-client privilege to equate them.”129 Third, 
the court failed to establish a clear approach to the implied-waiver issue, finding 
that “the discretion of whether a privilege has been impliedly waived belongs to the 
trial court judge, who has access to the entirety of the record . . . and who can 
determine whether any disclosures thus far impliedly waived the privilege.”130 The 
court provided no clear guidance, however, on how the trial court should make  
that determination. 
As the dissent noted, the three main approaches to implied waiver “reflect a 
thorough and thoughtful analysis of the issue.”131 The majority eschewed this 
analysis entirely. Instead, the majority observed that “a person impliedly waives 
privilege on an issue when that person testifies, introduces evidence, or fails to 
object to another’s testimony as to the ailment or privileged conversation.”132 The latter 
exception is clear and well settled: introducing privileged conversations, even under 
the narrow approach, waives the privilege.133 Use of the term “ailment,” however, 
only clouds the issue, for it arguably suggests a medically diagnosed condition, “a 
bodily disorder or chronic disease,”134 and thus does not rule out a Tier One 
approach, honoring the privilege where the testimony and evidence of emotional 
distress do not rise to such a level. The decision from which the court borrowed 
this term, McUne v. Fuqua,135 supports this conclusion. In McUne, a personal injury 
case,136 three doctors testified as to plaintiff’s medical woes, one of whom 
“diagnosed [his] arm condition as ‘brachial neuritis.’”137 Plaintiff “took the witness 
stand and testified that the injuries and disabilities described by his doctors resulted 
from the accident.”138 The “particular ailments for which plaintiff received 
treatment,” moreover, included “lumbago,” “rheumatic conditions in both 
[shoulders],” and “neuritis of the right shoulder and arm.”139 Under any  
approach—broad, narrow, or Tier One—the introduction of such evidence would 
effect a waiver. The court’s analysis therefore sheds little light on the proper 
approach for Washington’s lower courts. 
Finally, the Magney court based its remand upon the fact that the record was 
unclear as to “the extent of any mental anguish discussed [in] marital counseling or 
 
129. Id. at 1087. 
130. Id. at 1080. 
131. Id. at 1091 (McCloud, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
132. Id. at 1087 (emphasis added). 
133. See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 230 (D. Mass. 1997) (“Should 
she use the substance of her communication, by calling her psychotherapist as a witness, for example, 
or by testifying to the substance of the communication herself, then she would waive the privilege.”). 
134. Ailment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ailment 
[https://perma.cc/YD2T-4VLJ ] ( last visited Sep. 28, 2021). 
135. McUne v. Fuqua, 253 P.2d 632 (Wash. 1953). 
136. Id. at 634. 
137. Id. at 639. 
138. Id. at 638. 
139. Id. at 637. 
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whether that particular mental anguish has any bearing on or connection to the 
mental anguish as pleaded in the complaint.”140 The first clause of the sentence 
seemingly implicates a typical Tier One approach, under which “the extent of any 
mental anguish” is examined to determine whether the plaintiff is claiming “garden 
variety” emotional distress (no waiver) or more serious mental anguish (waiver).141 
The second clause, however, introduces a mere relevancy test (“any bearing”). This 
is a recurrent error in cases that find implied waiver of the privilege.142 
Examining relevance in determining the question of waiver fundamentally 
misapprehends the very essence of privilege. Testimonial privileges are in 
derogation of the common law principle favoring the inclusion of all relevant 
evidence.143 They therefore reflect a studied and, in the case of statutory privileges, 
express legislative decision to shield certain communications from discovery even 
where those communications might be relevant. “The very nature of a privilege is 
that it prevents disclosure of information that may be relevant in the case, in order 
to serve interests that are of over-arching importance.”144 As the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court has explained, “[s]uch exceptions are justified by a public good that 
transcends the general principle of using all rational means for ascertaining truth. 
Evidentiary privileges promote sufficiently important interests to justify the 
sacrifice of some available probative evidence.”145 Hence, “relevance alone cannot 
be the test, because such a test would ignore the fundamental purpose of evidentiary 
privileges, which is to preclude discovery and admission of relevant evidence under 
 
140. Magney v. Pham, 466 P.3d 1077, 1087 (Wash. 2020). 
141. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
142. See, e.g., Black v. Pan Am Labs, LLC, No. 1:07-CV-924, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126497, at 
*8 (W.D. Tex. July 8, 2008) (“Those cases treating claims for incidental emotional distress as 
constituting waivers . . . [erroneously] focus on relevancy and on the fact that emotional health is ‘in 
issue.’” (citation and internal quotations omitted)). 
143. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) (“[A] psychotherapist-patient privilege 
will serve a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means 
for ascertaining truth.”); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 331, 331 (1950) (“When we come to examine 
the various claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to 
give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly 
exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive general rule.” (citations and internal quotations 
omitted)); Desclos v. S. N.H. Med. Ctr., 903 A.2d 952, 956 (N.H. 2006) (“Evidentiary privileges are 
exceptions to the general duty to give all testimony that one is capable of giving.” (citations omitted)). 
144. Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 637 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting Hucko v. City of Oak 
Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 530 (N.D. Ill. 1999); accord Noe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons, No. 10 C 2018, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39492, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2011) (“Indeed, privileges often protect 
information that is relevant to the litigants’ dispute.” (citation omitted)). 
145. Desclos, 903 A.2d at 956 (citations omitted). See, e.g., Deborah Paruch, From Trusted 
Confidant to Witness for the Prosecution: The Case Against the Recognition of a Dangerous-Patient 
Exception to the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 9 U.N.H. L. REV. 327, 331 (2011) (“[U]nlike other rules 
of evidence designed to improve the reliability of the fact-finding process, the rules governing the scope 
and effect of privileges operate to ‘impede the search for truth by excluding evidence that may be highly 
probative.’ Privileges are justified by the need to protect the privacy of certain relationships and the 
need to encourage open communications within these relationships.”); Anderson, supra note 3, at 122 
(“[P]rivileges by their nature exclude relevant evidence but do so in favor of a competing public 
policy.”); Smith, supra note 3, at 117 (“[P]rivileges necessarily run counter to truth-seeking functions.”). 
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prescribed circumstances.”146 Numerous state supreme courts have echoed this 
conclusion,147 as did the Supreme Court, definitively, in Jaffee.148 
Injecting a relevancy test when deciding the question of waiver, then, ignores 
the seminal fact that a testimonial privilege perforce sacrifices potentially relevant 
information in favor of the public policies that led the legislators to codify the 
privilege or, in the case of the federal common law, the Supreme Court to do so. 
Indeed, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Jaffee is telling on this score. Justice Scalia protested 
that the “purchase price” of the Court’s decision to recognize the privilege is 
“occasional injustice,” adding that “[t]hat is the cost of every rule which excludes 
reliable and probative evidence.”149 Justice Scalia was the only member of the Court 
to so argue: all of the other justices voted in favor of imposing that cost,150 
explaining that “a psychotherapist-patient privilege will serve a public good 
transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for 
 
146. R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 842 (Tex. 1994) (citation omitted); accord Hoffman  
v. Brookfield Republic, Inc., 87 P.3d 858, 864 (Colo. 2004) (quoting the same sentence in R.K.). 
147. See, e.g., Ex parte W. Mental Health Ctr., 884 So. 2d 835, 841 (Ala. 2003) (“[N]or do we 
find any implication that the Legislature intended an exception to the psychiatrist-patient privilege to 
be applied where a party seeks information relevant to the issue of the proximate cause of another 
party’s injuries.”); People v. District Court of Denver, 719 P.2d 722, 727 n.3 (Colo. 1986) (“[W]e reject 
the application of a balancing test.” (citation omitted)); Gould, Larson, Bennet, Wells & McDonnell, 
P.C. v. Panico, 869 A.2d 653, 659 (Conn. 2005) (“[O]ur recent case law clearly underscores that mere 
need and relevance are not a sufficient basis to waive the [attorney-client] privilege.”); Woods v. State, 
No. 69237, 2017 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 838 (Nev. Sept. 28, 2017) (“[E]ven if the information were 
relevant to Woods’ criminal proceeding, adopting a balancing test would introduce uncertainty into the 
attorney-client privilege’s application.”); Desclos v. S. N.H. Med. Ctr., 903 A.2d 952, 957 (N.H. 2006) 
(“Relevance alone is not the standard for determining whether or not privileged materials should be 
disclosed.” (citations omitted)); Cirale v. 80 Pine Street Corp., 316 N.E. 2d 301 (N.Y. 1974) (“[I]if the 
information sought is in fact privileged, it is not subject to disclosure no matter how strong the showing 
of need or relevancy.”); In re Miller, 584 S.E.2d 772, 785 (N.C. 2003) (“Such a [balancing] test, regardless 
of how well intentioned and conducted it may be, or how exigent the circumstances, would likely have, 
in the immediate future and over time, a corrosive effect on the privilege’s traditionally stable 
application and the corresponding expectations of clients.”); In re J.M.G., 229 A.3d 571, 579 (Pa. 2020) 
(“[T]he policy goals underlying the psychotherapist-patient privilege is not dependent on evidentiary 
value or ‘protection of the fact finding process.’ Rather, it is designed to strengthen and protect the 
therapeutic relationship between a patient and his or her mental health treatment providers, without 
which the goals of this Commonwealth’s mental health treatment policies could not be achieved.”); 
R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1994) (“[R]elevance alone cannot be the test, because such a 
test would ignore the fundamental purpose of evidentiary privileges, which is to preclude discovery  
and admission of relevant evidence under prescribed circumstances.” (citation omitted)); State  
ex rel. Med. Assurance of W. Va., Inc. v. Recht, 583 S.E.2d 80, 92 (W. Va. 2003) (“[U]sing a balancing 
test to govern the discoverability of privileged communications is unknown to the common law.”). 
148. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17; see, e.g., Kronenberg v. Baker & McKenzie LLP, 747 F. Supp. 2d 
983, 985 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“[C]onsistent with the importance attached to that vital public interest, the 
Court in Jaffee rejected any balancing test that would allow a judge, in determining questions of privilege, 
to weigh the privilege against the asserted need for the evidence.”). 
149. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18–19 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
150. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the majority in establishing the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege. See id. at 18 (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia only as to Part III of his 
dissent, i.e., regarding extension of the privilege to social workers). 
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ascertaining truth.”151 Legislatures that have passed statutes codifying the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege have similarly voted to impose that cost: “By 
creating an evidentiary privilege, society has made a judgment that fostering certain 
ideals or relationships is worth the potential sacrifice involved in terms of the loss 
of relevant evidence.”152 Courts should not, through judicial fiat, engraft an 
antithetical balancing test upon those statutes.153 
As the dissent in Magney pointed out, finally, the majority conflated waiver 
with relevance.154 Relevance is a threshold requirement for the discovery of facts in 
any litigation. In Washington, for example, Civil Rule 26(b)(1) limits discovery to 
material that “is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.”155 
As we have just seen, however, the whole point of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege is to preclude discovery and admission of evidence even when it is relevant. 
“[I]f relevance were the test, then privilege may as well not exist, because even 
unprivileged material must be relevant to be discoverable.”156 This is precisely the 
conclusion that eight justices of the Supreme Court reached in Jaffee: “Making the 
promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of the 
relative importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for 
disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege.”157 
 
151. Id. at 15 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
152. Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614, 631 (S.D. Cal. 1999); accord Smith, supra 
note 3, at 117 (“Privileges exist where courts or legislatures have determined, for policy reasons, that 
such evidence should be protected from disclosure, notwithstanding its relevance.”). 
153. See, e.g., Ex parte W. Mental Health Ctr., 884 So. 2d 835, 841 (Ala. 2003) (“[N]or do we 
find any implication that the Legislature intended an exception to the psychiatrist-patient privilege to 
be applied where a party seeks information relevant to the issue of the proximate cause of another 
party’s injuries.”); Clark v. Dist. Court, 668 P.2d 3, 9 (Colo. 1983) (“There being no statutory language 
conditioning the applicability of the physician-patient and psychologist-client privileges on a judicial 
balancing of interests, we decline to engraft one onto the statute.”). 
154. Magney v. Pham, 466 P.3d 1077, 1089 (Wash. 2020). (McCloud, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); accord Megan I. Brennan, Evidence, Social Psychology, and Health Care: Scalpel  
Please: Cutting to the Heart of Medical Records Disputes in Employment Law Cases, 41 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 992 (2015) (“Courts often conflate privilege/waiver with relevancy . . . .” (footnote and internal 
quotations omitted)); Melissa L. Nelken, The Limits of Privilege: The Developing Scope of Federal 
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Law, 20 REV. LITIG. 1, 22 (2000) (“Compelling disclosure of 
confidential communications simply because the plaintiff claimed emotional distress damages would 
confuse relevance and the limits of privilege . . . .”). 
155. Wash. CR 26(b)(1). 
156. Magney, 466 P.3d at 1092 (McCloud, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
157. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996); accord Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 
U.S. 399, 409 (1998) (“Balancing ex post the importance of the information against client interests, even 
limited to criminal cases, introduces substantial uncertainty into the privilege’s application. For just that 
reason, we have rejected use of a balancing test in defining the contours of the privilege.” (citations 
omitted)); United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 323 (1992) (“Parties may forfeit a privilege by exposing 
privileged evidence, but do not forfeit one merely by taking a position that the evidence might 
contradict.”); Sims v. Blot, 534 F.2d 117, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2008) (“If this principle were not the rule, 
then in virtually every case a forfeiture might be found, as in virtually every case the party opposing the 
privilege could argue that the psychological record might reveal evidence that the party asserting the 
privilege is testifying falsely.”). 
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The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Fagen v. Grand View Univ.158 is similarly 
of limited usefulness to our analysis. In Fagen, a personal injury case,159 the court 
examined the issue of implied waiver under patient-litigant exception.160 In addition, 
the court announced that “[t]he person seeking the patient’s waiver need only 
advance some good-faith basis demonstrating how the records are reasonably 
calculated to lead to admissible evidence germane to an element or factor of the 
claim or defense.”161 As in Magney, the court thus erroneously conflated waiver with 
relevancy and suggested a rule for waiver that is no different than the fundamental 
rule that all evidence sought must be reasonably calculated to lead to admissible 
evidence.162 Fagen is plainly wrong to the extent that it vitiates the  
psychotherapist-patient privilege based upon a mere showing of relevancy, and it is 
limited to the statute upon which it is based.163 
Nonetheless, the court left the door open to a garden variety approach: 
[T]he record on appeal does not include discovery documents identifying 
the mental injury damages Fagen is seeking. The briefs and pleadings 
indicate he is only claiming damages for garden-variety pain and suffering 
and mental distress, which he defines as the emotional suffering any 
normal person would have experienced because of the assault he endured, 
and not as a specific psychiatric or psychological condition. He also claims 
in his brief and pleadings that he does not intend to introduce expert 
witnesses to support this claim. 
 
158. Fagen v. Grand View Univ., 861 N.W.2d 825 (Iowa 2015). 
159. Id. at 828. 
160. See id. at 832; see, e.g., Gunzinger v. John Lucas Tree Experts Co.,  
No. 2:17-CV-00125-GZS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186903, at *19 n.4 (D. Me. Nov. 12, 2017) (noting, 
analogously, that an Iowa district court’s assessment “pertained to an implied waiver of the privilege by 
virtue of the application of Iowa’s patient-litigant exception,” and concluding that “it interprets Iowa 
state law and is neither controlling nor persuasive”). As this Article makes clear, and as the New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, and Texas decisions cited supra confirm, a plaintiff does not put her mental health “at issue,” 
and thus does not trigger a patient-litigant exception, by merely alleging emotional distress damages. See 
supra notes 112–123 and accompanying text. Accordingly, this statutory exception should not have 
altered the court’s conclusion. 
161. Fagen, 861 N.W.2d at 835. 
162. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.503(1) (information sought in discovery must be “relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the pending action” and “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence”). 
163. The court repeatedly explained that its decision was based upon, and indeed mandated by, 
the specific patient-litigant exception in question. See, e.g., Fagen, 861 N.W.2d at 832 (“The statute 
provides for a patient-litigant exception.” (citation omitted)); id. at 832 (“Iowa has deemed that when a 
person files a claim he or she waives privilege under section 622.10. . . .” (citation omitted)); id. at 832 
(“The statute recognizes two competing interests . . . .” (citation omitted)); id. at 832 (“If the  
patient-litigant exception is applicable, Iowa law no longer protects as privileged the information to 
which the exception applies.”); id. at 833 (“The last sentence of Section 622.10(2) clearly limits the 
admissibility of the waived record only if . . . .” (citation omitted)); id. at 834 (“The language of Section 
622.10 is clear and unambiguous. The legislature has determined the patient-physician privilege is not 
absolute in the context of civil litigation.”); id. at 834 (“To decide when and how a party will be required 
to provide a waiver to allow another party in a civil case to access mental health records, we must 
construe section 622.10.”). 
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However, the record on appeal does not include discovery documents 
limiting his claim to a garden-variety mental distress claim. Additionally, 
the record does not include any discovery responses stating the extent or 
nature of his mental distress claim. Furthermore, the record does not 
include medical records regarding his physical injuries to gain further 
insight into his damage claims in this case.164 
If mere relevance is the test, then the question of “garden variety” mental 
distress is irrelevant, as are the other hallmarks of Tier One analysis cited by the 
court: whether plaintiff experienced “a specific psychiatric injury or psychological 
condition”; whether plaintiff “intend[s] to introduce expert witnesses to support 
[her] claim”; and “the extent or nature of [her] mental distress claim.”165 As one of 
the three bases for his dissent, moreover, Judge Mansfield protested: “I do not 
believe the underlying statute . . . allows for a garden-variety exception.”166 Not 
surprisingly, then, Fagen has sewn confusion among commentators. One 
commentator has observed: “[T]he court deemed the plaintiff’s mental health 
records irrelevant to the garden-variety emotional distress damages he was claiming, 
and his medical records were kept confidential,”167 while another has observed that, 
contrary to the Tier One approach, “in Iowa, under Fagen, the need for information 
is the controlling principle.”168 
Finally, the only two state supreme court cases to clearly adopt a broad 
approach involve, like Fagen, personal injury claims and express patient-litigant 
exceptions. Hence, in Vahai v. Gertsch,169 the Supreme Court of Wyoming adopted 
a broad rule under an exception to the privilege “where a patient or client, by alleging 
mental or emotional damages in litigation, puts his mental state in issue.”170 Similarly, 
in Dudley v. Stevens,171 the Supreme Court of Kentucky adopted a broad approach 
under a Kentucky statute providing an exception where “the patient is asserting that 
patient’s mental condition as an element of a claim or defense.”172 
In sum, a sizeable majority of state supreme courts has rejected the broad 
approach to implied waiver. Those that have adopted the broad approach have done 
so in personal injury cases and pursuant to express patient-litigant statutes, 
 
164. Id. at 830, 836 (“Both [parties] are urging an absolute rule. We disagree with  
both positions.”). 
165. Id. at 836. 
166. Id. at 837 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). 
167. Emma Garl Smith, The Importance of the Garden-Variety Exception to Mental Health 
Privilege Waivers in Protecting Patient Privacy, 27 ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 72, 77 
(2017). Note that, among other things, in Fagen, the court did not rule that plaintiff’s mental health 
records be kept confidential, but instead found: “we are unable to determine from the record before 
us and the arguments made by the parties whether [defendant] is entitled to a waiver releasing the 
specific records he seeks,” and remanded the case to the district court. Fagen, 861 N.W.2d at 836. 
168. Abdullah M. Azkalany, Note, A Comparative Examination of the Doctor-Patient Privilege in 
State and Federal Courts in Iowa, 67 DRAKE L. REV. 495, 509 (2019). 
169. Vahai v. Gertsch, 455 P.3d 1218 (Wy. 2020). 
170. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-27-123 (emphasis added). See Vahai, 455 P.3d at 1237. 
171. Dudley v. Stevens, 338 S.W.3d 774 (Ky. 2011). 
172. KRE 507(c)(3); see Dudley, 338 S.W.3d at 776. 
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circumstances inapposite to the interpretation of civil rights claims and state 
privilege laws lacking such exceptions. 
III. THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE AND EMOTIONAL-DISTRESS 
CLAIMS IN NEW YORK: ESTABLISHING A CERTAIN AND PRINCIPLED RULE 
“[T]he question of whether this privilege has indeed been forfeited requires 
careful scrutiny.”173 In the quarter century since Jaffee, many federal and state courts 
throughout the country have applied that scrutiny, including New York’s federal 
courts.174 Anomalously, however, New York’s state courts from top to bottom have 
failed to address this question. As a result, a quarter century of jurisprudence has 
simply passed New York by. Civil rights (and other) plaintiffs in New York have no 
idea whether, and under what circumstances, they will be deemed to have impliedly 
waived their privilege. This has created an unjust discrepancy: claimants in New 
York’s federal court are subject to the established “garden-variety” rule, which 
protects the privilege (if imperfectly) in many instances, while claimants in state 
court—advancing the same civil rights claims—face an “uncertain privilege.”175 Still 
worse, when courts perfunctorily, and without analysis, resort to the broad rule, as 
in Gomez (discussed in Section II, supra), they enjoy no privilege at all. 
Civil rights litigants in the nation’s third-largest state, and the nation’s largest 
city, deserve better. New York courts must reject the broad approach to waiver, as 
New York’s federal courts, and the clear majority of both federal and state supreme 
courts, have done. In doing so, the courts should adopt a narrow approach. As the 
following discussion reveals, this approach not only provides the certainty that is 
essential to protecting patients’ rights, but it comports with fundamental principles 
of waiver and privilege and the spirit and purpose of New York’s civil rights laws.176 
A. Implied Waiver of the Privilege in New York’s Federal Courts 
In Sims v. Blot,177 an excessive force lawsuit against corrections officers,178 
respondents/defendants argued that application of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege “will deny defendants information vital to their defense” and necessary “to 
allow defendants to rebut Sims’s testimony.”179 They contended that anyone who 
asks for pain and suffering damages “has waived the psychiatric privilege,” and that 
 
173. Malowsky v. Schmidt, No. 3:15-CV-666, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229306, at *6  
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2017). 
174. See infra Section IV.A.; Laudicina v. City of Crystal Lake, 328 F.R.D. 510, 512  
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2018) (“The judges in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of  
Illinois – indeed, nationwide – have been collectively wrapped around an axle on this issue for decades.” 
(citations omitted)). 
175. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996). 
176. See infra Section IV.C. 
177. Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2008). 
178. Id. at 120. 
179. Id. at 127 (emphasis omitted). Respondents so argued even after plaintiff represented “that 
he would not offer any evidence at trial with respect to his mental state.” Id. 
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“psychiatric records might conceivably disprove the experiencing of the pain and 
suffering.”180 Rejecting these arguments, the court observed that if it accepted these 
rationales for discovery, “the confidentiality of the psychotherapist-patient 
communications would be uncertain—if not extinguished—in a great number of 
cases.”181 Citing “the transcendent importance of the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege as discussed in Jaffee,”182 the court rejected the lower court’s finding that 
“fairness required that Sims’s disclose his psychiatric records,”183 ruling: 
[W]e reject respondents’ contentions that anybody who requests damages 
for pain and suffering has waived the psychiatric privilege because the 
psychiatric records might conceivably disprove the experiencing of the 
pain and suffering, that any claim of even . . . “garden variety” injury waives 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege, and that a plaintiff’s mental health is 
placed in issue whenever the plaintiff’s claim for unspecified damages may 
include some sort of mental injury. In reality respondents simply seek to 
have the privilege breached whenever there is a possibility that the 
psychiatric records may be useful in testing the plaintiff’s credibility or may 
have some other probative value. To accept these contentions would inject 
the balancing component that Jaffee foreclosed, and would disregard the 
principle that “[p]arties . . . do not forfeit [a privilege] merely by taking a 
position that the evidence might contradict.” If this principle were not the 
rule, then in virtually every case a forfeiture might be found, as in virtually 
every case the party opposing the privilege could argue that the 
psychological record might reveal evidence that the party asserting the 
privilege is testifying falsely.184 
The Second Circuit did not expressly define the term “garden variety” other 
than the unhelpful “garden-variety emotional injury that would ordinarily result 
from a physical assault.”185 The court did, however, note: “[W]e look to see whether 
the privilege holder took affirmative steps to inject privileged materials into the 
litigation.”186 The court also favorably cited the analysis in Koch v. Cox,187 under 
which a plaintiff waives the privilege “if he ‘does the sort of thing that would waive 
the attorney-client privilege, such as basing his claim upon the psychotherapist’s 
communications with him,’ or ‘selectively disclos[ing] part of a privileged 
communication in order to gain an advantage in litigation,’ or ‘su[ing] the therapist 
 
180. Id. at 130 (emphasis omitted). 
181. Id. at 129. 
182. Id. at 134. 
183. Id. at 120. 
184. Id. at 141–42 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 323 (1992)) (additional 
citations and quotations omitted). 
185. Id. at 129. 
186. Id. at 132 (internal quotations removed) (quoting United States v. Doe, 219 F.3d 175, 187 
(2d Cir. 2000)). 
187. Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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for malpractice.’”188 These factors, it should be noted, are the touchstones of a 
narrow approach to waiver. 
Since Sims, New York’s federal courts have adopted varying definitions of 
“garden variety,” with some focusing on whether the plaintiff advances claims for 
“serious distress,” i.e., “the inducement or aggravation of a diagnosable dysfunction 
or equivalent injury.”189 Others have cited plaintiff’s agreement “not to offer any 
privileged communication or other evidence regarding her psychiatric treatment or 
condition” and disavowal of “any claim to non-garden-variety emotional 
injuries.”190 A comprehensive review of all relevant cases, however, reveals a 
consensus in favor of the definition set forth in Olsen v. County of Nassau: 
In “garden variety” emotional distress claims, the evidence of mental 
suffering is generally limited to the testimony of the plaintiff, who describes 
his or her injury in vague or conclusory terms, without relating either the 
severity or consequences of the injury. Such claims typically lack 
extraordinary circumstances and are not supported by any medical 
corroboration.191 
Like all Tier One formulations, this definition is imprecise, with the words 
“generally” and “typically” signaling room for additional discretion.192 Nonetheless, 
the broad contours are there, with two essential elements emerging. First, Tier One 
claims are not supported by medical testimony and evidence.193 Second, and relatedly, 
Tier One claims generally do not involve the kind of “substantial harm” that might 
 
188. Sims, 534 F.3d at 133–34 (quoting Koch, 489 F.3d at 391). 
189. Willey v. Kirkpatrick, No. 07-CV-6484CJS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105863, at *8 
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2011) (quoting Kunstler v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 1145, 2006  
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61747, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006)); accord Diunugala v. Dep’t of Conservation, 
No. CV 16-03530-DSF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229721, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2018) (“Emotional 
distress that is not garden variety may be complex, such as that resulting in a specific  
psychiatric disorder.”). 
190. Griffin v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. CV 10-4560, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74595, at *2 
(E.D.N.Y. July 12, 2011). 
191. Olsen v. Cnty. of Nassau, 615 F. Supp. 2d 35, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (citations and internal 
quotations omitted). Courts in the Second Circuit utilize three tiers of emotional distress claims. 
According to this formulation: 
“Significant” emotional distress claims differ from the garden-variety claims in that they are 
based on more substantial harm or more offensive conduct, are sometimes supported by 
medical testimony and evidence, evidence of treatment by a healthcare professional and/or 
medication, and testimony from other, corroborating witnesses. Finally, “egregious” 
emotional distress claims generally involve either outrageous or shocking discriminatory 
conduct or a significant impact on the physical health of the plaintiff. 
Id. at 46–47. 
192. For example, in United States v. Asare, one plaintiff produced a witness to his emotional 
distress at trial, but she was a lay witness. He did not proffer any medical diagnosis or corroboration, 
and claimed only Tier One damages. United States v. Asare, 476 F. Supp. 3d 20, 32, 37, 40  
(S.D.N.Y. 2020). 
193. The contradistinction with Tier Two claims buttresses this conclusion. See Olsen, 615  
F. Supp. 2d at 46 (explaining that Tier Two claims differ from Tier One claims in that they “are 
sometimes supported by medical testimony and evidence”).  
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warrant evidence of treatment.194 Whether testimony of emotional distress is “vague 
or conclusory” is arguably subsumed under these elements, for without the 
testimony of a mental health professional or evidence of a diagnosed mental health 
condition, the plaintiff’s testimony will by definition lack the specificity that only 
such evidence can provide.195 
B. Implied Waiver of the Privilege in New York’s State Courts 
1. New York’s Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 
In New York, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is a creature of statute. In 
three different provisions of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, New York law 
establishes the privilege for psychiatrists,196 psychologists,197 and any “licensed 
master social worker” or “licensed clinical social worker.”198 The provision 
governing psychologists, for example, provides: “The confidential relations and 
communications between a [registered] psychologist . . . and his client are placed on 
the same basis as those provided by law between attorney and client, and nothing 
in such article [of the education law] shall be construed to require any such 
privileged communications to be disclosed.”199 
Like the Supreme Court, New York courts have recognized that for 
psychotherapy to be effective, there must be an atmosphere of confidence and trust: 
Imbedded in these three statutes is the recognition that such professionals 
could not provide the service of mental and emotional healing unless their 
patients “opened up” to them, disclosing innermost secrets, longings and 
conflicts of the individual’s psyche. Without such frank disclosure by the 
patient, the rewarding fruits of a psychotherapist’s careful and important 
work can never be realized.200 
Also like the Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals has recognized 
that the privilege “is in derogation of the common law,” but it should nonetheless 
 
194. See id. 
195. See, e.g., Henderson v. Rite Aid of N.Y., Inc., No. 16-CV-785V, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
101620, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. June 18, 2018) (“[T]o the extent that plaintiff intends to use mental health 
records as evidence of significant trauma or a diagnosable mental health condition caused by the allegations 
in her complaint, she cannot shield her mental health records, including her mental health history, from 
review by defendants.” (emphasis added)); Willey v. Kirkpatrick, No. 07-CV-6484CJS, 2011  
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105863, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2011) (“[C]laims for serious distress refer to claims 
for ‘the inducement or aggravation of a diagnosable dysfunction or equivalent injury.’” (emphasis added) 
(quoting Kunstler v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 1145, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61747, at *7  
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006)). 
196. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504(a) (McKinney 2021). 
197. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4507 (McKinney 2021). 
198. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4508 (McKinney 2021). 
199. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4507 (McKinney 2021). 
200. Siesto by Siesto v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 640 N.Y.S.2d 737, 739 (Sup. Ct. 1996)  
(citation omitted). 
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“be afforded a broad and liberal construction to carry out its policy of encouraging 
full disclosure by patients so that they may secure treatment.”201 
Under New York’s separate evidentiary privileges, only the  
psychologist-patient privilege is expressly placed on the same footing as the 
attorney-client privilege.202 There is, however, no principled basis for distinguishing 
among these privileges with respect to psychotherapy and implied waiver. All 
three—psychiatrists, licensed social workers, and psychologists—engage in 
psychotherapy.203 Indeed: 
Whether the protected relationship involves physician, psychologist or 
certified social worker, all share the common purpose of encouraging the 
patient or client fully to disclose the nature and details of his illness or his 
emotions without fear of later revelation by one in whom he placed his 
trust and confidence.”204 
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court included all three under the federal 
common law, in furtherance of the “public good transcending the normally 
predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.”205 
The Court of Appeals, moreover, has specifically ruled that the privilege 
governing the patient-psychiatrist relationship should be liberally construed “to carry 
out its policy of encouraging full disclosure by patients so that they may secure 
treatment.”206 Meanwhile, the statute governing licensed social workers expressly 
provides four exceptions to the privilege, none of which resembles a patient-litigant 
exception.207 In addition, excluding licensed social workers would be both 
discriminatory and antithetical to the civil rights laws, for “social workers are often 
the predominant mental health providers in inner-cities, frequently serving  
non-Caucasian populations.”208 As the Supreme Court concluded in Jaffee, social 
workers’ “clients often include the poor and those of modest means who could not 
afford the assistance of a psychiatrist or psychologist, but whose counseling sessions 
 
201. People v. Rivera, 33 N.E.3d 465, 469 (N.Y. 2015) (citation and internal quotations 
omitted). Rivera concerned defendant’s “admissions to his psychiatrist.” Id. at 470. 
202. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504 (McKinney 2021); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4507 (McKinney 2021);  
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4508 (McKinney 2021). 
203. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 8401(2) (McKinney 2021) (containing broad definition  
of “Psychotherapy”). 
204. Perry v. Fiumano, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382, 384 (App. Div. 1978) (citations omitted); accord 
Liberatore v. Liberatore, 955 N.Y.S.2d 762, 765 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (“The shared purpose of these statutes 
is to encourage ‘the patient or client fully to disclose the nature and details of his illness or his emotions 
without fear of later revelation by one in whom he placed his trust and confidence.’” (quoting Perry, 
403 N.Y.S.2d at 384)). 
205. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 
50 (1980)). 
206. Rivera, 33 N.E.3d at 469. 
207. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4508(a) (McKinney 2021) (providing exceptions only: upon client 
authorization; for communications regarding a crime or harmful act; where the client is under 16; and 
where the client brings charges against the social worker). 
208. Rebecca S. Auerbach, Comment, New York’s Immediate Need for a Psychotherapist-Patient 
Privilege Encompassing Psychiatrists, Psychologists, and Social Workers, 69 ALB. L. REV. 889, 909 (2006).  
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serve the same public goals.”209 Hence, “[d]rawing a distinction between the 
counseling provided by costly psychotherapists and the counseling provided by 
more readily accessible social workers serves no discernible public purpose.”210 
2. The Case Law 
In Quinter-Dolenz v. Choy,211 the only New York case on point, future Court of 
Appeals Justice Abdus-Salaam ruled that “[e]ven if plaintiff has consulted or is being 
treated by mental healthcare providers, plaintiff’s garden variety emotional pain and 
suffering claim (as distinguished from a specific claim for psychological damages) 
does not necessitate discovery of plaintiff’s psychiatric or psychological records.”212 
Judge Abdus-Salaam adopted a “garden variety” approach without providing an 
analysis of the relevant issues or the myriad cases, post-Jaffee, that have thoughtfully 
engaged with the principles implicated by this question.213 Unfortunately, no New 
York court has ever done so. 
In Koump v. Smith,214 the Court of Appeals adopted a general personal injury 
rule: “[B]y bringing or defending a personal injury action in which mental or physical 
condition is affirmatively put in issue, a party waives the [doctor-patient] 
privilege.”215 This rule is plainly inapposite to the question of implied waiver of the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege in civil rights cases and is distinguishable on a 
number of grounds. First, this general personal injury rule merely begs the  
questions: when, precisely, is privileged material placed “in issue” and does a civil 
rights plaintiff place privileged psychological material at issue where she disavows 
any intent to reply upon or introduce privileged records or communications in 
support of her claim? The law has evolved on this issue over the past few decades,216 
and this hoary formulation does not begin to answer these questions. This explains 
why Justice Abdus-Salaam did not even mention this rule in adopting a Tier One 
approach.217 Koump and its progeny shed no light on the specific issue addressed 
here, for decisions that fail to assess the relevant issues and approaches are neither 
enlightening nor persuasive.218 
 
209. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 16 (citation omitted). 
210. Id. at 17 (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1358 n.19 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
211. Quinter-Dolenz v. Choy, No. 103874/05, 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9494  
(Sup. Ct. Apr. 16, 2007). 
212. Id. at *4. 
213. See id. 
214. Koump v. Smith, 250 N.E.2d 857 (N.Y. 1969). 
215. Id. at 861; accord Dillenbeck v. Hess, 536 N.E.2d 1126, 1132 (N.Y. 1989). 
216. See, e.g., Atkins v. LQ Mgmt., No. 3-13-0562, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205230, at *9  
(M.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2014) (“[T]he law has evolved somewhat since 1998, in terms of the development 
of a majority view that psychiatric and psychological records of a plaintiff asserting only garden variety 
emotional distress claims are not discoverable.”). 
217. See Quinter-Dolenz, 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9494. 
218. See, e.g., LeGendre v. Cnty. of Monroe, 600 N.W.2d 78, 90 (Mich. App. 1999) (rejecting 
broad approach to waiver and observing: “We have found very few cases holding to the contrary, and 
agree with the conclusion of other courts that have considered these cases that they are either 
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Second, as noted, this rule was crafted in personal injury rather than civil rights 
cases. In fact, in formulating the rule, the Court of Appeals in Koump opined that 
“in personal injury actions there is little reason for the [doctor-patient privilege].”219 
As the Supreme Court of Missouri has noted, however, “[i]njuries caused by 
deprivations of civil rights differ from most other tort claims,”220 and in civil rights 
cases, there are strong policy arguments in favor of a narrow approach, for broad 
waiver is “antithetical to the purpose” of civil rights laws.221 
This is particularly the case in New York: both New York’s state and city 
human rights laws express a strong policy against discrimination and a remedial 
purpose even broader than that provided under federal law.222 Indeed, in 2005, the 
New York City Council (City Council) passed the Local Civil Rights Restoration 
Act of 2005 “to reverse the pattern of judicial decisions that had improvidently 
narrowed the scope of the law’s protections.”223 Pursuant to the “uniquely broad 
and remedial purposes” of the Human Rights Law (HRL),224 “courts must analyze 
[HRL] claims separately and independently from any federal and state law claims, 
 
distinguishable or were decided without analysis and are thus not persuasive”); see also Mara Kent and 
Thomas Kent, Michigan Civil Rights Claimants: Should They Be Required to Give up Their  
Physician-Patient Privilege When Alleging Garden-Variety Emotional Distress?, 77 U. DET. MERCY  
L. REV. 479, 498–99 (2000) (“It is clear that for the courts that have thoroughly analyzed the issue, 
production of privileged documents or compulsion to undergo a mental examination should be used 
only in certain, limited circumstances.” (emphasis added)). 
219. Koump, 250 N.E.2d at 861. 
220. State ex rel. Dean v. Cunningham, 182 S.W.3d 561, 567 (Mo. 2006). 
221. Ruhlmann v. Ulster Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 194 F.R.D. 445, 451 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); 
accord Kennedy v. Mun. of Anchorage, 305 P.3d 1291, 1291(Alaska 2013) (“Moreover, wide-ranging 
inquiry into an individual’s medical and psychiatric history could deter legitimate discrimination 
claims.”); Cunningham, 182 S.W.3d at 566 (“To allow a wide-ranging and legally irrelevant inquiry into 
a claimant’s medical and psychological history could work at cross-purposes to the [Human Rights] Act 
by deterring legitimate claims.”). See supra notes 32–38 and accompanying text. 
222. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 300 (McKinney 2021) (“The provisions of this article shall be 
construed liberally for the accomplishment of the remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether 
federal civil rights laws, including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of 
this article, have been so construed. Exceptions to and exemptions from the provisions of this article 
shall be construed narrowly in order to maximize deterrence of discriminatory conduct.”);  
N.Y. Inst. of Tech. v. State Div. of Hum. Rts., 353 N.E.2d 598, 603 (N.Y. 1976) (noting “[t]he State’s 
strong and important public policy against discrimination,” and finding that “the [state] Human Rights 
Law should be liberally construed in order to accomplish its purposes”); infra notes 223–226 and 
accompanying text (explaining uniquely broad, remedial purpose of New York City Human  
Rights Law). 
223. Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 31 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting  
COMM. ON GEN. WELFARE, REPORT ON PROP. INT. No. 22-A, N.Y.C. LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 536 
(2005)); accord Local Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2005, N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW 85, § 1 (2005) (“It is the 
sense of the Council that New York City’s Human Rights Law has been construed too narrowly to 
ensure protection of the civil rights of all persons covered by the law.”). 
224. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-130 (emphasis added); see also Williams, 872 N.Y.S.2d at 31 
(“[T]he City HRL now explicitly requires an independent liberal construction analysis in all 
circumstances, even where State and federal civil rights laws have comparable language. The 
independent analysis must be targeted to understanding and fulfilling what the statute characterizes as 
the City HRL’s ‘uniquely broad and remedial’ purposes, which go beyond those of counterpart State or 
federal civil rights laws.”). 
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construing the [HRL]’s provisions broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to 
the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible.”225 Finding that civil 
rights plaintiffs forfeit their psychotherapist-patient privilege by merely claiming 
emotional distress damages—an inevitable concomitant of civil rights  
lawsuits—robs civil rights litigants of the protections afforded in New York’s 
federal courts and directly contravenes the legislature’s “aim of making [the HRL] 
the most progressive in the nation.”226 
Third, the general personal injury rule lumps the physician-patient and 
psychotherapist-patient privileges together, sweepingly referring to any “mental or 
physical condition.”227 The privileges are different, however, and the question 
whether a personal injury plaintiff waives her privilege as to medical records is very 
different from the question whether a civil rights litigant waives the  
psychotherapist-patient privilege for distress incidental to the discrimination claim. 
As the Supreme Court explained in Jaffee: 
Treatment by a physician for physical ailments can often proceed 
successfully on the basis of a physical examination, objective information 
supplied by the patient, and the results of diagnostic tests. Effective 
psychotherapy, by contrast, depends upon an atmosphere of confidence 
and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete 
disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive 
nature of the problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists, 
disclosure of confidential communications made during counseling 
sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere 
possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential 
relationship necessary for successful treatment.228 
 
225. Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., 715 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2013) (citations 
and internal quotations omitted); Albunio v. City of New York, 947 N.E.2d 135, 137 (N.Y. 2011). 
226. Bumpus v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 859 N.Y.S.2d 893, 893 (Sup. Ct. 2008), aff’d, 883 
N.Y.S.2d 99 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (“The New York City Human Rights Law sets forth a broad 
purpose. The legislative history contemplates that the Law be independently construed with the aim of 
making it the most progressive in the nation.” (citations omitted)); accord Jordan v. Bates  
Advert. Holdings, Inc., 816 N.Y.S.2d 310, 317 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (“The Administrative Code’s legislative 
history clearly contemplates that the New York City Human Rights Law be liberally and independently 
construed with the aim of making it the most progressive in the nation.”). 
227. Koump v. Smith, 250 N.E.2d 857, 861; accord Dillenbeck v. Hess, 536 N.E.2d 1126, 1132 
(N.Y. 1989). 
228. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996); accord Wei v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D. 91, 97  
(D.N.J. 1989) (“The relationship between a psychotherapist and her patient is substantially different 
from that between a doctor and her patient. Patients must confide their most intimate dreams, hopes, 
fears, and other personal information to their therapists. Without full disclosure there is little hope that 
the therapy can be successful. While there are other medical situations in which confidentiality may be 
equally important, courts have recognized the special relationships that psychotherapists have with their 
patients in according these communications legal confidentiality in some situations.” (citations 
omitted)); Mazza v. Huffaker, 300 S.E.2d 833, 837 (N.C. App. Ct. 1983) (“Psychiatrists are physicians. 
The first duty of a physician to a patient is to do no harm; the second is to maintain the patient’s trust 
and confidence in the physician. These basic duties apply and are even more stringent with psychiatrists, 
since a psychiatrist’s patient reveals his innermost thoughts, feelings, worries, and concerns.”); Michael 
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Perhaps for the same reason, “in New York, the confidentiality of an 
individual’s clinical psychiatric records is held to a stricter standard than an 
individual’s general medical records.”229 
Fourth, the chief argument in favor of waiver cited in Koump and its progeny 
is that recognizing the privilege “would allow a party to use it as a sword rather than 
a shield.”230 Under the sword-shield analogy, however, “a party cannot partially 
disclose privileged communications or affirmatively rely on privileged communications to 
support its claim or defense and then shield the underlying communications from 
scrutiny by the opposing party.”231 This analogy is plainly inapplicable where a 
plaintiff makes no use of the privileged communications in support of her emotional 
distress claim. As the court in Vanderbilt v. Chilmark232 reasoned: 
Plaintiff, here, is not using the privileged communication as a sword. Were 
she to introduce evidence regarding the substance of her conversations 
with her psychotherapist in order to further her claim of emotional 
damage, this court would agree that she could not shield the 
communication for others. She has, however, done no such thing.233 
“[P]recluding plaintiffs from relying on the privileged communications to 
further their own claim,” the Alaska Supreme Court has explained, “prevents the 
privilege from being used as both a shield and a sword.”234 Hence, provided that 
 
L. Orenstein, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 20 TOURO L. REV. 679, 702 (2004) (“During the 
diagnosis of a patient, a doctor does not need confidential information to recognize a heart attack. Nor 
would a doctor require confidential information to diagnose a sprained ankle. However, in mental 
health therapy, treatment necessarily requires reliance upon things that are extremely confidential, very 
sensitive, and there is a tremendous privacy concern.”); David L. Hayden, Should There Be a 
Psychotherapist Privilege in Military Courts-Martial?, 123 MIL. L. REV. 31, 40 (1989) (“Unlike the 
physician who may be able to cure ailments without the patients’ trust or communications, the 
psychotherapist must have the patients’ confidence. In few other situations will individuals bare their 
souls and subject themselves to the mental dissection of another. Communications in the 
psychotherapist-patient relationship can only originate in confidence that they will not be disclosed.”). 
229. Midgett v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 916 N.Y.S.2d 888, 893 (Sup. Ct. 2010). The generic 
lumping of the “mental or physical” is categorically wrong at least with respect to the  
psychologist-patient privilege, for the New York Legislature placed the psychologist-patient privilege 
on a higher footing, i.e., “on the same footing as that between attorney and client rather than physician 
and patient.” People v. Wilkins, 480 N.E.2d 373, 377 (N.Y. 1985). As discussed supra, however, at least 
with respect to implied waiver, the policy considerations in favor of a broad privilege apply equally to 
all three psychotherapist-patient privileges. See supra notes 203–210 and accompanying text. 
230. Koump, 250 N.E.2d at 861. See, e.g., Dillenbeck, 536 N.E.2d at 1135 (“[T]he person 
asserting the privilege cannot have it both ways and especially may not use the shield as a sword.”). 
231. United States v. Doe, 219 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). 
232. Vanderbilt v. Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225 (D. Mass. 1997). 
233. Id. at 230. 
234. Kennedy v. Mun. of Anchorage, 305 P.3d 1284, 1289 (Alaska 2013) (quoting Fitzgerald  
v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 637 (N.D. Cal. 2003)); accord Morrisette v. Kennebec Cnty.,  
No. Civ. 01-01-B-S, 2001 WL 969014, at *2 (D. Me. Aug. 21, 2001) (“[T]he proper subject for the 
waiver analysis is whether the substance of a particular communication has been placed in issue, not 
whether the topic of communication is relevant to the factual issues of the case.”); Hucko v. City of 
Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 528 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (“A number of other district courts have held that 
allegations of emotional pain and suffering can impliedly waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege, 
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the plaintiff does not “use the substance of her communication, by calling her 
psychotherapist as a witness, for example, or by testifying to the substance of the 
communication herself,”235 she has not used the privilege as a sword and thus has 
not waived it, as numerous courts and commentators have concluded.236 
The provenance of the sword-shield analogy under New York law buttresses 
this conclusion. In the first usage of the analogy, the Court of Appeals examined a 
case in which a physician “testified fully in [plaintiff’s] behalf as to all of the facts 
bearing upon her physical condition, as affected by the accident on the defendant’s 
railroad.”237 In a second trial against the same defendant, the plaintiff objected to 
the introduction of physician-patient communications with the same physician 
“upon the ground that the information acquired by a physician, while attending a 
patient, was privileged and could not, therefore, be admitted against the plaintiff 
without her consent.”238 The Court of Appeals rejected this argument,  
 
but in factual contexts where—unlike this case—the plaintiff sought to offer evidence from 
psychotherapists to bolster that claim.”). 
235. Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 230 n.8. 
236. See, e.g., Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 140 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that where plaintiff “will 
not offer any testimony from Dr. Mihalakis concerning the effect of [his] emotional state . . .the district 
court erred in indicating that [plaintiff] essentially used his privilege as a sword” (citation omitted)); 
Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 390 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (acknowledging sword-shield analogy but finding no 
issue since, “in this case [plaintiff] neither sued his therapist nor relied upon her communications with 
him”); United States v. Robinson, 5 F. Supp. 3d 933, 940 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (“In short, a plaintiff must 
use the privileged communication as evidence herself before she waives the privilege.”); Johnson  
v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 157 (Colo. 1999) (finding that where plaintiff, inter alia, “does not plan to call 
any expert witness to testify about her mental suffering,” there was no “danger that [plaintiff] is 
effectively making an unseemly, offensive use of the privilege”); Noe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons,  
No. 10 C 2018, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39492, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2011) (“[T]he  
psychotherapist-patient relationship is not waived when a plaintiff does not intend at trial to offer 
evidence of consultations with a psychotherapist or rely on expert testimony concerning the distress 
allegedly caused by a defendant’s actions.”); Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614, 632  
(S.D. Cal. 1999) (“Even if the Plaintiff can be said to have placed her mental or emotional condition at 
issue by claiming damages for emotional distress, the Court finds that she has not waived the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege since she has not put the substance of communications between 
herself and her psychotherapist(s) at issue in this litigation.”); D’Ambrosio, supra note 35, at 942  
(sword-shield analogy only applicable where plaintiff is “disclosing or introducing some privileged 
material”); Smith, supra note 3, at 143–44 (“[C]ourts should consider whether a plaintiff has truly 
attempted to use the privilege as a sword instead of a shield. Where the plaintiff seeks no claim to 
recover for payment of mental health treatment related to [an] accident and lists no mental health 
provider as a witness, there can generally be no finding that the plaintiff has made an offensive use of 
the privilege upon which a court could infer waiver.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted); 
Nelken, supra note 153, at 29 (regarding court’s use of sword-shield analogy: “The court’s reasoning 
ignores the fact that the plaintiff had not indicated any intent to use the counselor’s testimony to support 
her emotional distress claim”); see also Hucko, 185 F.R.D. at 528 n.3 (“A number of other district courts 
have held that allegations of emotional pain and suffering can impliedly waive the  
psychotherapist-patient privilege, but in factual contexts where—unlike in this case—the plaintiff 
sought to offer evidence from psychotherapists to bolster that claim.”). 
237. McKinney v. Grand St., P. P. & F. R. Co., 10 N.E. 544, 544 (N.Y. 1887). 
238. Id. 
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observing: “The patient cannot use this privilege both as a sword and a shield, —to 
waive when it inures to her advantage, and wield when it does not.”239 
Some courts posit, finally, that a plaintiff’s testimony as to the symptoms she 
has experienced implicates the psychotherapist-patient relationship and thus waives 
the privilege.240 Provided that the plaintiff testifies without relating any privileged 
communications or evidence, this is incorrect. “[I]f emotional distress damages are 
to be supported by expert testimony or evidence of medical or psychological 
treatment, the privilege is waived. If such damages are to be inferred from the 
circumstances, the privilege is not waived.”241 In the latter instance, the plaintiff 
sacrifices her ability to bolster her emotional distress claims with the significant 
assistance of expert testimony and professional diagnoses,242 leaving both plaintiff 
 
239. Id. See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Am. Re-Insurance Co., No. 604517/02, 2008  
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 10434, at *6 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 21, 2008) (“[T]o selectively disclose privileged 
communications would cause the attorney-client privilege to be used as both a sword and a shield, 
resulting in fundamental unfairness.” (emphasis added) (quoting Weizmann Inst. of Sci. v. Neschis,  
No. 00 Civ. 7850, No. 01 Civ. 6993, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4254, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2004)). 
240. See, e.g., Flowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 227 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“[Plaintiff] could not 
testify about resulting symptoms or conditions such as his claimed persistent and pervasive fear of 
retaliation by the [police] . . . and still maintain the psychotherapist/patient privilege.”); Santelli  
v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306, 309 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (“[S]he may not offer evidence through any 
witness about symptoms or conditions that she suffered (e.g., sleeplessness, nervousness, 
depression).”). Testimony regarding persistent fear, and sleeplessness, nervousness, and depression, 
unadorned by psychotherapist communications or testimony, is merely factual, lay testimony, well 
within the ken of a lay jury. See, e.g., Duarte v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 341 F. Supp. 3d 306, 321  
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (plaintiff’s complaints of “insomnia, lower self-esteem, depression, anxiety, and 
stomach aches and headaches — unsupported by medical corroboration — establish no more than 
‘garden variety’ emotional distress”); MacCluskey v. Univ. of Conn. Health Ctr., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23520, at *49–50 (D. Conn.) (finding no waiver where plaintiff “described how the experience had 
affected and continues to affect her,” including her testimony of feeling “ashamed and embarrassed,” 
“afraid to be home alone,” and “afraid to go out in public”; that she “didn’t sleep for weeks”; that “her 
work was affected and that she used all of her time off when she started working at a new facility”; that 
she “always trusted people and now I don’t trust anybody”; and that “the harassment has also affected 
her relationship with her children”), aff’d, 707 Fed. Appx. 44 (2d Cir. 2017); Makinen v. City of New 
York, 167 F. Supp. 3d 472, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding merely “garden variety” claim where plaintiff 
testified that she “suffers from continuing anxiety, depression, restless legs, sleeplessness, and panic 
attacks as a result of Defendants’ conduct”; “described the physical symptoms of her panic attacks: her 
legs and arm[s] cramp up, her tongue swells, her heart races, and she experiences tunnel vision and 
shortness of breath”; and “testified that she had been prescribed anti-anxiety medication to treat her 
symptoms and that she continues to take the medication”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 
722 Fed. Appx. 50 (2d Cir. 2018); Ewald v. Royal Norwegian Embassy, Civil No. 11-CV-2116, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192896, at *16–17 (D. Minn. April 15, 2014) (finding claim merely “garden variety” 
where plaintiff alleged discrimination “damaged her self-esteem and self-confidence, and caused 
significant emotional distress, embarrassment, inability to trust, and other mental and physical 
symptoms of severe stress and anxiety”). 
241. State ex rel. Dean v. Cunningham, 182 S.W.3d 561, 568 (Mo. 2006). 
242. See, e.g., Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1999) (“[W]hen the jury calculates 
the amount of damages to award [plaintiff] . . . the jury will not be made aware of the details of her 
treatment for depression or her marriage counseling.”); Flowers, 274 F.R.D. at 220 n.2 (“An agreement 
to limit an emotional distress claim to ‘garden variety emotional damages’ limits not only the extent of 
allowable discovery by the defendant, but also limits the proof at trial and the amount of recoverable 
damages.”); Santelli, 188 F.R.D. 306, 309 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (“She may be better off disclosing her 
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and defendant in the same position they would have occupied if the plaintiff never 
sought treatment.243 
A lay jury is perfectly capable of assessing the testimony of a lay witness as to 
the common symptoms of distress—e.g., headaches, sleeplessness, fatigue, sadness, 
depression, embarrassment, anxiousness, fear, strained relationships, and 
humiliation. Indeed, “[a] party seeking to have a mental health professional opine 
as to whether an opposing party truly felt embarrassed or humiliated or as to what 
it means to experience such emotions would be hard pressed to explain why such 
testimony was beyond the ken of a lay jury.”244 A defendant can cross-examine the 
plaintiff and any fact witnesses,245 and the “weight to be accorded the testimony of 
witnesses who testify about emotional distress is for the jury to determine under 
appropriate instructions.”246 The fact that the privileged communications might 
nonetheless be relevant and useful to the defendant is irrelevant, for, as the Court 
of Appeals has explained, “if the information sought is in fact privileged, it is not 
subject to disclosure no matter how strong the showing of need or relevancy,”247 
and “[p]arties . . . do not forfeit [a privilege] merely by taking a position that the 
evidence might contradict.”248 
 
psychological records, which would allow her to make a broader damage claim.”); Anderson, supra note 
3, at 143 (“The plaintiffs in these . . . cases chose to maintain the privilege rather than seek full recovery 
for their emotional distress.”). 
243. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Cnty. of Erie, 546 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Here, . . . there is no 
unfairness . . . because [respondents] are ‘in no way worse off’ as a result of the disclosure that 
communications exist than they would be if they were unaware of them.” (quoting John Doe  
Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 2003))). 
244. Jarrar v. Harris, No. CV 07-3299, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57307, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 
2008) (citation and internal quotations omitted); accord id. at *16 (“Lay jurors are entirely competent to 
evaluate [plaintiff’s] allegations that he was scared, embarrassed, shamed, and humiliated as a result of 
the defendants’ alleged misconduct, and that he continues to feel similar emotions in certain situations 
to this day.”). 
245. See, e.g., EEOC v. Big Five Corp., No. C17-1098RSM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85944, at 
*12 (W.D. Wash. May 22, 2018) (“[W]hile the privilege may bar access to those records, [defendant] 
may cross-examine Mr. Sanders about other stressors or contributing factors that may explain or have 
contributed to the alleged emotional distress.”); Latour v. Town of Plainfield, No. CV 136006398, 2014 
Conn. Super. LEXIS 1524, at *14 (June 18, 2014) (“Defendant retains the right to attempt through 
cross examination or other means to impeach plaintiff’s credibility . . . .”); Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 
F.R.D. 632, 638 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“[The] broad approach to waiver . . . is not necessary to achieve basic 
fairness to the defendant. While the privilege may bar access to medical records, the defendant may 
cross-examine the plaintiff . . . about other stressors or contributing factors that may explain or have 
contributed to the alleged emotional distress.”). 
246. Flowers, 274 F.R.D. at 226. 
247. Cirale v. 80 Pine St. Corp., 316 N.E.2d 301, 303 (N.Y. 1974). 
248. United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 323 (1992). See Kronenberg v. Baker & McKenzie 
LLP, 747 F. Supp. 2d 983, 985 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“If this principle were not the rule, then in virtually 
every case a waiver might be found since the party opposing the privilege could argue plausibly that the 
psychological records might well reveal significant evidence that would contradict the evidence offered 
by the party asserting the privilege or call into question the privilege holder’s veracity.”). 
Clean Final Edit_Merjian.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/8/21  8:18 AM 
2021] IMPLIED WAIVER FOR CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGANTS 261 
C. Adopting a Certain and Principled Approach 
Civil rights litigants in New York’s state courts should enjoy a  
psychotherapist-privilege at least as strong as that accorded plaintiffs in New York’s 
federal courts.249 The lack of a certain rule in New York’s state courts is not only 
unjust, but it has a chilling effect, forcing plaintiffs to eschew state court (if possible) 
for fear that their psychotherapist-patient privilege might be waived.250 This means, 
at a minimum, rejecting a broad approach in favor of the Tier One approach utilized 
by New York’s federal courts. The Tier One approach is, however, a compromise 
approach,251 and like many compromises, it sacrifices principle, along with both 
certainty and justice. It is anything but certain, as courts have pointed out: “[T]he 
use of a test for waiver that hinges on an after-the-fact judicial assessment of 
numerous qualitative factors introduces a risk of uncertainty that the Supreme Court 
in Jaffee sought to avoid.”252 Indeed, to the extent that it calls upon a court to 
determine whether a plaintiff “does not exceed the kind of mental suffering that an 
ordinary person would experience in similar circumstances,”253 it is, as noted, both 
wildly imprecise and offensive.254 Additionally, it is “based more on considerations 
of relevance and fairness than on the law of privilege and waiver.”255 Relevance and 
fairness, however, are irrelevant to the question of implied waiver, for waiver 
 
249. See, e.g., Claim of Lazarus, 52 N.Y.S.2d 682, 687 (App. Div. 1944) (“While federal statutes 
and decisions are not binding on us they are highly persuasive and uniformity in interpretation is 
desirable.”); People v. Perez, 848 N.Y.S.2d 525, 531 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (“Although not binding, federal 
court decisions concerning federal statutes analogous to state laws are generally highly persuasive 
authority, since uniformity in the interpretation of federal statutes and state statutes is desirable.”). 
250. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
251. See, e.g., Wright v. Martinez, No. 2:18-cv-01126-WJ-KRS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174421, 
at *7 (D.N.M. Oct. 7, 2019) (“[T]he garden-variety concept represents a compromise between, 
obviously enough, the ‘narrow approach’ and the ‘broad approach.’”); Laudicina v. City of Crystal Lake, 
328 F.R.D. 510, 518 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“But the ‘garden variety’ approach—being a compromise 
approach—can be problematic for plaintiffs as well.”). 
252. Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 639 (N.D. Cal. 2003); accord Flowers v. Owens, 274 
F.R.D. 218, 225 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (noting “the imprecision and elasticity of the phrase ‘garden variety’”); 
McKenna v. Cruz, No. 98 Civ. 1853, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18293, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1998). 
253. Desclos v. S. N.H. Med. Ctr., 903 A.2d 952, 959 (N.H. 2006). 
254. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
255. Anderson, supra note 3, at 119. 
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focuses upon the affirmative acts of the privilege holder,256 and not the relevance 
of the material sought257 or the “fairness” of honoring the privilege.258 
Unlike the Tier One approach, the narrow approach provides the certainty 
that, among others, the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have recognized as 
essential to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.259 And unlike the broad approach, 
the narrow approach adheres to fundamental rules of waiver and privilege, by which 
a party waives the privilege only when she “does the sort of thing” that would waive 
the privilege, such as disclosing or relying upon privileged communications in 
support of her claim.260 
Arguments against this approach almost invariably echo arguments against 
adoption of the privilege itself. Whether explicitly or implicitly, opponents of the 
narrow approach protest that the psychotherapist-patient privilege derogates from 
the principle that all relevant material should be discoverable and admissible.261 
They then ironically proceed to craft a rule that itself derogates from the principle 
that testimonial privileges are waived only where the party relies upon or discloses 
privileged communications. This is often done in the professed interest  
of “fairness.”262 
 
256. See, e.g., Amerex Group, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 678 F.3d 193, 201 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“[T]he doctrine of waiver appropriately focuses on the actions—or inaction—of the party against 
whom waiver operates.”); Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“[W]aiver focuses on the actions of the party charged with waiver.”); Hyland v. Sheldon, 686 N.W.2d 
198, 204 (Iowa 2004) (“Like waiver, this doctrine focuses on the action of the individual who holds the 
right to determine whether it has been waived.”); Sims v. Blot, 534 F.2d 117, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(“[N]othing in the record here suggests that Sims made a knowing election to waive his  
psychotherapist-patient privilege.”); Smith, supra note 3, at 105 (“The underlying principles of waiver, 
in whatever context, require courts, when determining whether there has been a waiver, to focus 
exclusively on the knowledge, decisions, and actions of the holder of the right allegedly waived.”). 
257. See supra notes 142–156 and accompanying text. 
258. See, e.g., Sims, 534 F.3d at 120 (rejecting lower court’s finding that “fairness required that 
Sims disclose his psychiatric records”); Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 637 (N.D. Cal. 2003) 
(fairness considerations “would render the psychotherapist-patient privilege pointless”); Hucko v. City 
of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 530 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (“[A]nalyzing the ‘fairness’ of whether to permit a 
claim of privilege or instead deem it waived would promote uncertainty in the scope of the 
privilege . . . .”); Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614, 631 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (“Defendants’ 
argument that it would be ‘unfair’ not to require production of the records they seek because to do so 
might deprive them of important evidence that is relevant to the issue of emotional distress damages 
reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the law of privilege.”); infra note 263 and 
accompanying text. 
259. See supra notes 1, 64, 157, 181, 184 and accompanying text. 
260. See Sims, 534 F.3d at 133–34; Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
261. See, e.g., Boyd Isherwood, Note, The Psychologist-Patient Privilege: Time for a Change in 
Kansas, or Is It All in Our Heads?, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 659, 672 (1998) (“The chief argument against 
the psychotherapist privilege is that the court has ‘a right to every man’s evidence.’”(quoting United 
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950))). 
262. See Fitzgerald, 216 F.R.D. at 636 (“The rationale behind the [broad] line of cases is 
generally based on fairness considerations.”); Smith, supra note 3, at 82 (“[U]nder the guise of implied 
waiver, many courts analyze the controversy employing considerations of privacy and fairness 
developed under the rules governing discovery procedure. . . . Such considerations, however, have no 
place in a determination of waiver.”); Anderson, supra note 3, at 135 (“Arguments for the broad 
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The difference, however, is that the legislature, in establishing the 
psychotherapist-patient privileges, has already considered the various policy issues 
involved in creating a privilege, and has already determined that establishing the 
privilege, and thus potentially sacrificing relevant evidence, is fair: “By creating an 
evidentiary privilege, society has made a judgment that fostering certain ideals or 
relationships is worth the potential sacrifice involved in terms of the loss of relevant 
evidence.”263 The Court of Appeals has in fact recognized that the privilege must 
“be afforded a broad and liberal construction to carry out its policy of encouraging 
full disclosure by patients so that they may secure treatment.”264 The Court of 
Appeals has also recognized that 
it is inherent in the very nature of an evidentiary privilege that it presents 
an obstacle to discovery and it is precisely in those situations where 
confidential information is sought in advancing a legal claim that such 
privilege is intended to operate. Were we to carve out an exception to the 
privilege whenever it inhibited the fact-finding process, it would quickly 
become eviscerated.265 
This is particularly the case in civil rights litigation, in which the purpose of 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege “would be defeated were the broad or 
uncertain test of waiver applied and suits vindicating civil rights and seeking 
recovery for general damages thereby deterred.”266 Hence: 
While notions of fairness to the parties and the importance of providing 
fact finders competing evidence are central, important aims in our system 
of adversary litigation, their consideration has no place in an analysis of 
whether a plaintiff has waived a privilege if that privilege is to be given any 
force.267 
The standard of implied waiver in New York’s federal courts contains strong 
elements of the narrow approach, focusing as it should upon the question whether 
 
approach rely mainly on the need for ‘fairness’ to defendants, who should be allowed to challenge the 
causation of emotional distress.”); D’Ambrosio, supra note 35, at 952 (broad view’s “fairness argument 
rests on an inactionable relevance argument”). 
263. Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614, 631 (S.D. Cal. 1999); accord Ex parte  
W. Mental Health Ctr., 884 So. 2d 835, 841 (Ala. 2003) (“[N]or do we find any implication that the 
Legislature intended an exception to the psychiatrist-patient privilege to be applied where a party seeks 
information relevant to the issue of the proximate cause of another party’s injuries.” (quoting Ex parte 
Pepper, 794 So. 2d 340, 344 (Ala. 2001))); Zion v. New York Hosp., 590 N.Y.S.2d 188, 190  
(App. Div. 1992) (“While, doubtless, the exemption from disclosure for the JCAH records may, on 
occasion, hamper a malpractice plaintiff’s ability to ascertain relevant information, the Legislature has 
made a determination that, on balance, this consideration is outweighed by the benefit the privilege 
confers on the general public.”); Smith, supra note 3, at 117 (“Privileges exist where courts or legislatures 
have determined, for policy reasons, that such evidence should be protected from disclosure, 
notwithstanding its relevance.”). 
264. People v. Rivera, 33 N.E.3d 465, 469 (N.Y. 2015) (citation and internal quotations 
omitted). Rivera concerned defendant’s “admissions to his psychiatrist.” 
265. Dillenbeck v. Hess, 536 N.E.2d 1126, 1133 (N.Y. 1989). 
266. Fitzgerald, 216 F.R.D. at 639. See supra notes 32–41 and accompanying text. 
267. Smith, supra note 3, at 119. 
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the plaintiff has sought to rely upon the testimony of or communications with the 
psychotherapist.268 New York courts now have the opportunity to take the final 
step and adopt a narrow rule that is at once precise, easy to administer, and 
consonant with established principles of waiver and privilege. 
CONCLUSION 
As the majority of both federal and state supreme courts have concluded, the 
mere fact that emotional distress is “at issue” or “in controversy” does not mean 
that psychotherapist-patient communications are at issue or in controversy, even if 
they might be relevant to the litigation or helpful to the defendant. Instead, as both 
the Second and the D.C. Circuits have explained, a plaintiff waives the privilege only 
“if he ‘does the sort of thing that would waive the attorney-client privilege.’”269 If 
the plaintiff never proffers confidential communications or the testimony of a 
psychotherapist in support of her claim, then she has not used the privilege as a 
“sword,” and she has not waived its protections. 
Echoing Justice Scalia’s dissent in Jaffee,270 critics of the narrow approach to 
implied waiver object to the perceived unfairness of honoring the privilege. Like 
Justice Scalia, however, critics lost this argument when their legislatures voted to 
enact a psychotherapist-patient privilege without including a balancing test, or an 
exception based upon “fairness” or “relevance.”271 Until those legislatures change 
the laws to include automatic waivers based merely upon the interposition of an 
emotional distress claim, there is no principled basis for reading this exception into 
the law, and there can be no argument based upon “fairness.” Fairness requires that 
the laws be enforced as written, without engrafting exceptions that the legislature 
never intended. Such exceptions would eviscerate the privilege by rendering it 
uncertain, as numerous courts—including a nearly unanimous Supreme  
Court—have concluded. Concerns over fairness, moreover, are satisfied by 
precluding plaintiffs’ use of psychotherapist communications or testimony in 
support of their claims. 
This is particularly of concern for civil rights plaintiffs, who invariably rely 
upon emotional distress damages for compensation. If a mere claim for such 
damages waives the privilege, then civil rights claimants will be deterred from 
bringing suit—from acting as “private attorneys general”—in contravention of the 
 
268. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
269. Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 133 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 391 
(D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
270. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
271. See, e.g., Magney v. Pham, 466 P.3d 1077, 1083 (Wash. 2020) (“To read an automatic waiver 
into the statute would violate the interpretive canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius.”); Clark  
v. Dist. Ct., Second Jud. Dist., 668 F.2d 3, 9 (Colo. 1983) (“The legislature in enacting the  
physician-patient and psychologist-client privileges clearly delineated the type of information to which 
the privileges apply and, with equal clarity, designated those situations to which a particular privilege 
does not apply. When the legislature intended to qualify a privilege by permitting a court to balance 
interests in determining its applicability, it made its intent known in unmistakable terms.”). 
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spirit and purpose of federal, state, and local civil rights statutes. In light of this, and 
of “the transcendent importance of the psychotherapist-patient privilege,”272 federal 
and state courts nationwide must reject the broad approach to implied waiver in 
favor of a narrow approach, which not only confers certainty, but which adheres to 
established principles governing waiver and testimonial privileges. Only then will 


































272. Sims, 534 F.3d at 134. 
273. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)). 
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